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INTRODUCTION 
The rights and responsibilities of religious institutions are hotly debated 
in the early twenty-first century. Liberal separationists argue that religious 
organizations should be subject to secular laws regarding labor, health care 
(including access to birth control), child protection, and more. 1  Their 
opponents counter that the ideals of “church autonomy” or “the freedom of 
the church” exempt religious organizations from legal, administrative, or 
legislative oversight.2 The standoff is exacerbated by the opposing interpre-
tations of history on offer.3 Former presidential candidate, talk show host 
 
1 For litigation and political controversy surrounding such claims, see Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (rejecting an employment 
discrimination claim based on the “ministerial exception”); Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1069 
(9th Cir. 2009) (upholding jurisdiction over the Vatican under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 319, 331 (Colo. 1993) (upholding tort damages 
for clergy against First Amendment defense); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 
A.2d 1208, 1232 (Me. 2005) (affirming diocese’s duty to protect against the tortious acts of its 
clergy); John Eligon & Laurie Goodstein, Kansas City Bishop Convicted of Shielding Pedophile Priest, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/kansas-city-bishop-convicted-
of-shielding-pedophile-priest.html (reporting on the first American Catholic bishop criminally 
convicted for failure to report child abuse); Robert Pear, Bishops Reject Birth Control Compromise, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/health/bishops-reject-white-
house-proposal-on-contraceptive-coverage.html (describing the fight over whether religious 
employers should be exempt from laws requiring insurance coverage for contraception).  
2 See Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, and the Structure of Freedom, in 
CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 267 ( John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. 
Alexander eds., 2010) (arguing that religious communities should enjoy autonomy and freedom 
from state intervention); see also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional 
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008) (“[T]he existence and 
independence of religious institutions—self-defining, self-governing, self-directing institutions—
are needed . . . to check . . . secular power” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard W. 
Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59, 61 (2007) (suggesting that 
the libertas ecclesiae principle of freedom of the church is essential for understanding the First 
Amendment); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 107 (2009) (arguing that religious institutions embody their own 
“spheres” of autonomy while still recognizing the “fundamental importance of the state”). 
3 Compare Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church? 23-27, 34-38 (Univ. 
of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-061, 2011) (arguing 
that the religion clauses commonly credited actually refer only to religious organizations), with 
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(and historian) Newt Gingrich has called the Affordable Care Act’s re-
quirement that all secular employers—regardless of their owners’ religious 
affiliations and convictions—provide birth control insurance coverage for 
employees “the most outrageous assault on religious freedom in American 
history” and asserted that “every time you turn around the secular govern-
ment is shrinking the rights of religious institutions in America.”4  
From the other side of the spectrum, the invocation of history is equally 
strident. For example, Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State has battled against the claim that the government has undermined 
church autonomy. From this group’s perspective, strict separation of church 
and state is “good for America” and “good for religion” because it prohibits 
government involvement with religious organizations.5 American history, 
they argue, demonstrates that Presidents and right-thinking Americans alike 
have always supported their interpretation of disestablishment.6  
This back-and-forth highlights the sharply differing views among activ-
ists, scholars, and politicians regarding the tradition of special deference (or 
lack thereof) given to religious organizations. The Hobby Lobby case, set for 
argument at the Supreme Court in early spring 2014, is just the latest 
incarnation of these battles.7 The question is as old as the nation, however. 
The rights of individuals versus organizational rights have been essential to 
the development of the law of religion in America. The place of religious 
organizations was keenly debated as a key component of disestablishment. 
Yet we know almost nothing about the experience of such organizations in 
our nation’s history. 
 
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 
969 (2013) (“[R]ights of conscience . . . could account for most of the pressing issues involving 
religious groups, without any reference to church or religion.”). 
4 Amy Bingham, Gingrich Blasts Obama’s Birth Control Policy as “Outrageous Assault” on Religion, 
ABC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/gingrich-blasts-obamas-
birth-control-policy-as-outrageous-assault-on-religion. 
5 America’s Legacy of Religious Liberty—Pass It On, AMS. UNITED, https://www.au.org/files/ 
americas-legacy-of-religious.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2013). 
6 See Rob Boston, Falsehoods, By George!: Religious Right Seeks Retroactive Baptism of America’s 
First President, WALL OF SEPARATION (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.au.org/blogs/wall-of-
separation/falsehoods-by-george-religious-right-seeks-retroactive-baptism-of-america-s (claiming 
that no evidence supports the assertion that George Washington worked to connect church and 
state); Rob Boston, Freedom from Foolishness?: Texas Gov. Misconstrues Religious Liberty, WALL 
OF SEPARATION ( June 14, 2013), https://www.au.org/blogs/wall-of-separation/freedom-from-
foolishness-texas-gov-misconstrues-religious-liberty (arguing that Thomas Jefferson and other 
early American leaders drafted the First Amendment to protect freedom, not religious organiza-
tions).  
7 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that em-
ployer retail chain may invoke a religious objection to the Affordable Care Act’s birth control 
provisions), cert. granted, No. 13-354, 2013 WL 5297798 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2013). 
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Surprisingly enough, scholars have not studied how disestablishment 
actually worked in its first decades. What did it mean for a state to be 
disestablished, rather than just to announce that religious establishment was 
now prohibited? That question animates this Article, which builds on the 
prior work of scholars in the field of church and state, but also looks for 
answers in places others have ignored. The gradual commitment to disestab-
lish by the states, for example, has been the subject of extensive and impres-
sive scholarly research for at least the past century.8 We have long known in 
detail the stories of Virginia and Massachusetts, the former as an exemplar 
of a particularly clear commitment to disestablish early in 1786, and the 
latter as the last holdout, disestablishing only in 1833.9 The relationship of 
the federal religion clauses to the experience of the states has also been the 
object of considerable scholarly and judicial attention.10 Scholars disagree 
over what the states’ experiences in the lead-up to disestablishment tell us 
about current conflicts.11 But few researchers have probed what religious 
liberty meant on the ground in the states that carried it out,12 and none have 
 
8 See generally THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIR-
GINIA, 1776–1787 (1977); SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN 
AMERICA: A HISTORY (1902); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND 
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); M. LOUISE 
GREENE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CONNECTICUT (1970); MARK 
DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); MARK DOUGLAS MCGARVIE, ONE 
NATION UNDER LAW: AMERICA’S EARLY NATIONAL STRUGGLES TO SEPARATE CHURCH 
AND STATE (2004).  
9 See generally BUCKLEY, supra note 8; 2 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND 
DISSENT, 1630–1883: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1971) 
(tracing the opposition to religious establishment in New England). 
10 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment 
Clause into the Due Process Clause and holding that history dictates state payment for transporta-
tion of parochial school students was constitutional); id. at 33-44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that history directly prohibited such payments); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
162-64 (1879) (relying on the history of Virginia to determine the scope of protection for 
religiously inspired behavior); HOWE, supra note 8. 
11 There is no clear consensus regarding the Establishment Clause’s intended meaning when 
it was ratified in 1791—a factor that continues to fuel debate today. Compare DANIEL L. 
DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH 
AND STATE (2002) (arguing that Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of separation” did not contemplate a 
complete barrier of church and state), with LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed., rev. 1994) (arguing that history 
reveals that the Establishment Clause prohibits all public support for religion). 
12 Virginia is the exception to the rule and has received scholarly treatment in this area. See 
generally, e.g., DREISBACH, supra note 11; Thomas E. Buckley, Evangelicals Triumphant: The Baptists’ 
Assault on the Virginia Glebes, 1786–1801, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 33 (1988) (examining Virginia 
politics in the period after disestablishment). For a broader perspective on what free exercise 
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assembled an overview of the widespread legal powers and limitations 
imposed on churches by states once they had officially severed church and 
state. 
One explanation for the dearth of scholarship is that we have overlooked 
the implementation of disestablishment. The decision to disestablish 
represented an end in some ways but a beginning in many others.13 It was 
the prelude to a gradual yet broad-ranging, nationwide attempt to limit the 
ability of religious organizations to acquire and hold wealth. Equally 
important, states imposed strict controls on church governance,14 mandating 
the election of lay trustees to hold and manage church property. The desire 
to keep religious organizations both limited in size and firmly under lay 
control was key to the ongoing administration of disestablishment in the 
states. The rules were by no means identical, but they resembled each other 
enough to create a rough system. This first system of disestablishment 
imposed discipline on religious institutions, especially in terms of property 
and internal governance, based on concerns for individual conscience and 
lay control.  
Ironically, then, disestablishment set the stage for extensive legislative 
and judicial oversight of churches and other religious organizations. Even a 
brief review reveals an astonishing array of government regulation in the 
period between the end of formal establishment and the Civil War. Dises-
tablishment, it seems, was not widely understood as a mandate for govern-
ment deference to religious institutions or the separation of those 
institutions from government, at least according to today’s understanding of 
those terms. Quite the opposite—during the foundational period of Ameri-
can law, deep government involvement in religious institutions, rather than 
strict separation or respectful support, was characteristic and widely accepted.  
This Article excavates this first system of disestablishment, recovering 
and analyzing what has long been hidden in plain sight in state statutes and 
related judicial decisions. The most startling aspect of this history is the 
 
meant in the states, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, Blasphemy and the Law of Religious Liberty in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 52 AM. Q. 682 (2000). 
13 The great evangelist Charles Grandison Finney made a similar point about religion, focus-
ing on salvation not as an end but as a beginning. GILBERT HOBBS BARNES, THE ANTISLAV-
ERY IMPULSE: 1830–1844, at 9-12 (reprint 1957) (1933).  
14 In two states, the legislatures went further, actively declaring much religious land forfeited 
to the state. Virginia’s Glebe Act of 1802 has long been known to specialists. See generally Buckley, 
supra note 12. Vermont’s 1805 decision to redirect all unoccupied glebe lands to the public schools 
lay buried in the archives until recently, however. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Landscape of 
Faith: Religious Property and Confiscation in the Early Republic, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E. NELSON 13, 30 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R.B. Bernstein 
eds., 2013). 
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direct control states exercised over religious organizations’ property and 
power through statutes allowing “religious societies” (as they were commonly 
called) to incorporate. Consider, for example, the limitations on wealth 
imposed by most states, which capped real property acreage: two acres in 
Virginia, Maryland, and the congressionally governed District of Columbia; 
four acres in Kentucky; and five acres in Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Ten-
nessee.15 Limits were also imposed on total annual income: $1000 in New 
Hampshire; $2000 in Maryland; and $3000 in Maine, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota.16 Similar restrictions were enacted around the country,17 reveal-
ing that the practice was neither regional nor tied to the religious convic-
tions of legislators in particular jurisdictions. Instead, the pattern reveals 
something much more interesting: a system constructed by states to meet an 
unprecedented development—that is, the need to manage disestablishment. 
Part I details the background of this process. It first investigates the 
precedents for state restrictions and the pressures disestablishment placed 
on legislatures. It then discusses statutory and constitutional limits imposed 
on church property and income after formal disestablishment in return for 
the privilege of incorporation, and explores the ways courts interpreted 
these restrictions. Part II focuses on how disestablishment in the states also 
empowered the laity, giving congregants new power to control church assets, 
and thus to dictate church policy. Bitter disputes over slavery, personal 
morality, and individual conscience enmeshed religious organizations in 
litigation, as these newly empowered congregants fought with each other 
over the demands of faith. Part III probes the ways in which fractious 
groups of lay members challenged the role of clergy in religious life and 
practice—especially, but not only, in Roman Catholic communities. Clerics 
and religious hierarchies came under fire, as trustees and their supporters 
argued that lay governance meant pastors now served at the pleasure of the 
congregation. The empowerment of the laity and incorporation of religious 
organizations also meant that once-internal disputes, such as arguments over 
the “souls of black folk,”18 now had legal as well as religious salience. Part IV 
examines how slavery fractured religious life along regional lines. Disestab-
lishment, in this history, was critical—first to the flourishing of pluralism 
and then to the collapse of religious denominations, which were torn apart 
by the strident new powers of their congregants. 
 
15 See infra notes 61, 63 & 64 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text. 
18 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (reprint 1973) (1953). 
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The restrictions imposed on church wealth and power before 1860 and 
the law of disestablishment as developed in state courts challenge the notion 
that institutional autonomy was a meaningful or common concern among 
early Americans or their governments. The lessons of this history are many, 
but none sustains the notion that either strict separationism or “the freedom 
of the church” accurately accounts for how disestablishment was understood 
and implemented from the Revolution to the Civil War. Present-day 
activists from both sides of the debate who seek to ground their claims in 
tradition must instead grapple with a much different, more surprising 
legacy. 
I. THE CHALLENGES OF DISESTABLISHMENT 
By the early 1830s, all states—the original thirteen colonies and new 
states admitted after independence—were formally disestablished via 
constitutional provision. States admitted thereafter included such provisions 
in their initial constitutions.19 The process was not identical in each state: 
some of the original states and many of the new ones had never had formal 
establishments. But the movement was powerful, and within a generation 
after the Revolution, the idea of an established religion seemed to be a 
fundamental denial of liberty and corruption of genuine faith.20 Those who 
implemented disestablishment reflected similar attitudes toward liberty and 
 
19 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4; CONN. 
CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 3; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 3; 
GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VII, § 3; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. 
I, § 3; IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 3; KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS § 7 (1859); KY. CONST. of 1792, 
art. XII, § 3; ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 3; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 
XXXIII; MASS. CONST. amend. 11 (1833); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, §§ 4–6; MINN. 
CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 4; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 
5; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. I, art. VI; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. 
XXXVIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3; OR. CONST. 
of 1857, art. I, §§ 2–5; PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. 
of 1790, art. VIII; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 3; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 4; VT. 
CONST. of 1793, ch.1, art. III; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
Louisiana is the sole exception to this constitutional rule. The Louisiana Constitution of 1812 did 
not include a specific disestablishment clause. However, Congress voted to admit the new state 
because the enabling act of February 1811 instructed the Orleans Territory drafting convention that 
its proposed constitution must contain “the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty.” 
When considering the proposed constitution for the State of Louisiana, Congress stipulated that 
the requirements of the 1811 act were “deemed” to be part of the constitution. Thus Congress 
expressly concluded that Louisiana was a disestablished polity. See generally ANSON PHELPS 
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (rev. ed. 1964) (1950). Only in 
1921 did Louisiana amend its constitution to prohibit an establishment of religion, making explicit 
what had been required by Congress all along. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. I, § 4. 
20 See, e.g., MCGARVIE, supra note 8, at 3-20. 
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religious freedom. Regulating religious institutions, in other words, was a 
practice widely believed to serve individual conscience.  
Few scholars have investigated the history of disestablishment beyond 
the moment at which it took effect, and most have relied on a smattering of 
cases or the high-flown rhetoric of national leaders.21 Careful attention to 
the statutory record, however, reveals a great deal of activity, most of it 
aimed at carefully limiting the powers of religious organizations and 
empowering their individual members. As a result, these statutes focused 
chiefly on congregants, not clerics. This is a forgotten world, buried in part 
by time, but also by determined opposition. 
To recover this world, we must peel back the layers to expose the inter-
ests of those who helped paper over the truth. By the late nineteenth 
century, for example, proponents of increased wealth and power for reli-
gious institutions had decided that disestablishmentarian restrictions were 
best undermined by painting them as foreign. In 1875, U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice William Strong conceded to an audience at Union Theological 
Seminary that religious organizations’ power to acquire wealth was sharply 
limited.22 Strong claimed that these limitations were imposed by state 
legislatures motivated by “inherit[ed] . . . jealousy” of extensive landhold-
ing by “ecclesiastical persons and religious houses” in Britain.23 Known as 
mortmain laws, these medieval statutes restricted the capacity of religious 
institutions to acquire property by taking gifts of land from feudal lords and 
thus revenue from the king (in the form of taxes on a lord’s death or a 
ward’s marriage—levies never recoverable from religious organizations that 
neither died nor married).24  
 
21 Even Carl Zollman, the most serious student of the law of religion after disestablishment, 
apparently never read a statute. His chapter on religious corporations notes that a few mortmain 
statutes limited real property, but fails to recognize most of these, and entirely misses income 
limits. See CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 80-110 (1917). 
22 WILLIAM STRONG, TWO LECTURES UPON THE RELATIONS OF CIVIL LAW TO 
CHURCH POLITY, DISCIPLINE AND PROPERTY 69 (N.Y., Dodd & Mead 1875). 
23 Id. 
24 The mortmain statute of Edward I, known as “statutum de viris religiosis,” declared that 
“religious men have entered as well into their own fees as into the fees of other men . . . [and 
those] services that are due . . . and which at the beginning were provided for the defence of the 
realm are wrongfully withdrawn” and the escheats lost. RICHARD WHALLEY BRIDGMAN, THE 
LAW OF CHARITABLE USES, AS LAID DOWN AND DIGESTED BY GEORGE DUKE, ESQ. IN 
1676, TOGETHER WITH THE LEARNED READINGS OF SIR FRANCIS MOORE 193 (London, 
W. Clarke & Sons 1805). Feudal law favored ownership by a natural person, subject to death as 
well as forfeiture for crime or treason. Mortmain statutes restricted the creation of new mortmains 
and allowed the king and his lords to effect seizures for violations thereof. See Charles W. Sloane, 
Mortmain, in 10 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 579, 580 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 
The Encyclopedia Press 1913) (1911). Edward’s statute was vigorously enforced by mesne lords and 
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As a result of this English heritage, Strong observed complacently, stat-
utes in some states provided that “no religious society shall be incorporated, 
with power to hold property yielding a greater annual income than a 
specified sum.”25 Strong had a dog in the fight: he supported reestablishing 
Christianity as the country’s religion.26 But his backhanded dismissal of 
restrictions on church property as leftover gasps of mortmain in the New 
World apparently discouraged subsequent researchers. During the century 
and more since Strong’s speech, scholars have assumed his credibility on 
this subject. It is high time to correct the record. 
Indeed, Justice Strong was mistaken—restrictions on church property 
holding in America took many different forms, including constitutional 
provisions as well as legislation. The breadth and variety of such restrictions 
make it clear that something more than “inherited jealousy” was at work. 
The motivations for these restrictions also differed sharply from the British 
monarch’s desire for tax revenue, which undergirded English mortmain. In 
the new United States, state statutes and constitutional provisions govern-
ing religious institutions accomplished two related but distinct objectives. 
On the one hand, they imposed limits on religious authority, and on the 
other, protection for individual religious decisions and sensibilities. In other 
words, religious liberty was tightly bound up with institutional discipline. 
To protect individual liberty, churches were constrained in their capacities 
to acquire wealth and broadly subjected to lay control. 
American mortmain differed from its English ancestor in key respects, 
therefore, as it embodied the desire to empower individual choice rather 
than secular government or its officials. The individual states now adminis-
tered a landscape in which the effects of an earlier establishment were still 
visible and questions about how to address the wealth of religious organiza-
tion—in terms of land and money—became pressing.27 The King’s church 
no longer had an official role in an independent America, and consequently 
 
the crown, at least through the end of the fourteenth century. See generally SANDRA RABAN, 
MORTMAIN LEGISLATION AND THE ENGLISH CHURCH, 1279–1500, at 72-101 (1982). 
25 STRONG, supra note 22, at 69. 
26 For example, he campaigned for a “Christian Amendment” to the Constitution, which 
ultimately failed. See Morton Borden, The Christian Amendment, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 156, 160-61 
(1979) (detailing Strong’s support of a constitutional amendment declaring the United States a 
Christian nation). 
27 States struggled with these challenges to a greater extent than the federal government, 
which controlled only the District of Columbia and eventually the territories. When confronted 
with this issue, however, the federal government also struggled. See, e.g., An Ordinance for the 
Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio, 32 J. CONT’L 
CONG. 334, 339-41 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1936) (1787) (protecting religious liberty in federal 
territory). 
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the notion that property regulation was the surest route to achieve individual 
liberty was understood as a distinct product of independence from Britain. 
In this sense, ancient English property restrictions were repurposed in a 
new environment, salvaged from the remembered law of Britain, but grafted 
onto a new set of distinctly American structures and concerns.  
At the same time, however, American jurists and legislators used the 
vocabulary of the older legal regime. They called religious organizations 
“mortmain institutions”28  and noted that religious property “subtracted 
from the mass of transmissible wealth.”29 According to an early legal treatise 
on American corporate law, the ecclesiastical interests that had so frustrated 
Henry VIII were antithetical to a republican government.30 Yet religious 
institutions adapted quickly and successfully to the new environment—so 
successfully, in fact, that states granted them significant benefits, while also 
imposing significant restraints.  
The key to the change was the corporation. Long before businesses were 
granted the privilege of incorporation, religious societies popularized the 
corporate form for Americans.31 In most American jurisdictions, religious 
corporations were ubiquitous by the early nineteenth century, flourishing in 
the new regime of disestablishment. In Pennsylvania, for example, religious 
societies dominated the list of corporations formed between 1777 and 1791, 
when Pennsylvania enacted a general incorporation statute (fifty separate 
bills of incorporation, out of seventy-seven bills total).32 Even including 
townships and other private institutions, then, religious societies made up 
almost two-thirds of all new ventures. The preamble to the 1791 legislation 
explained that the representatives of the Commonwealth found their 
energies were taxed by the onslaught of such bills.33 Early on, special 
 
28  DAVID HENSHAW, REMARKS UPON THE RIGHTS AND POWERS OF CORPORA-
TIONS, AND OF THE RIGHTS, POWERS, AND DUTIES OF THE LEGISLATURE TOWARD 
THEM 14 (Bos., Beals & Greene 1837).  
29 Gov. Levi Lincoln, Veto Message, 16 February 1827, in RESOLVES OF THE GENERAL 
COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1824–1828, at 475 (Bos., Dutton & 
Wentworth 1828). 
30 See JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 129-31, 148-51 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832).  
31 See, e.g., Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & 
MARY Q. 51, 53 (1993) (noting Massachusetts’s large number of corporate charters for religious 
organizations in the 1780s and 1790s); see also Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious 
Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1505-09 (1973) (reviewing briefly the incorpora-
tion of religious organizations in colonial America). 
32 See 3 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 213-23 (Harrisburg, Packer, Barrett & Parks 1837) [hereinafter 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF PA.] (listing corporations formed from 1777 to 1791).  
33 Act of April 6, 1791, pmbl., PA. DIGEST OF LAWS 181 (Stroud 1841). 
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incorporation acts in Pennsylvania limited the amount of property that a 
given religious corporation could own, frequently in terms of annual income 
calculated in bushels of wheat.34 By the time the general incorporation 
legislation was enacted, these limits were phrased in monetary terms—
almost always £500.35 
A. Seeing Like a Disestablished State: Regulation  
Through Incorporation 
Religious societies became the quintessential private associations, simul-
taneously supported and disciplined by states. As in Pennsylvania, other 
state legislatures gradually developed a template for the formation of such 
institutions and, in the process, set the tone for disestablishment. The 
private law of religion—that is, the world of contracts, deeds, donations, 
mortgages, bank accounts, and so on, all owned and managed in corpora-
tions—thus became the source of the ongoing management of disestablish-
ment. In this sense, the religious corporation was not an element of 
establishment, but rather a manifestation of the people’s religious liberty. 
Such a corporation, at least in theory, reflected the integration of shared 
political and social interests in religion, tucked under the enabling authority 
of state legislatures and enforced by the judiciary.36 
In the service of a genuinely radical departure from tradition, then, dis-
establishment forced states to articulate the principles of a political world 
without the mainstay of divine sanction. In the 1790s, the French Revolu-
tion provided a cautionary tale of disestablishment run amok; most Ameri-
cans found themselves more sanguine than the French citoyens.37 In many 
jurisdictions, Americans had distanced themselves from the Church of 
England by the opening days of the Revolution; in some colonies, the 
rejection came considerably earlier.38  Patriots in the Revolutionary era 
nonetheless found attacks on the role of the King’s church in oppressing 
 
34 See 3 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF PA., supra note 32, at 213. 
35 See id. at 214-22. 
36 See Maier, supra note 31, at 82 (examining one perspective regarding “the proliferation of 
corporations”). For a claim that incorporation itself was a form of establishment, see Douglas G. 
Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 239, 241 (2003). 
37 The violent secularism of the French Revolution had less purchase in the American con-
text, despite avid support for disestablishment. See People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1811) (declaring that the United States would not follow France by defaming or oppressing 
religion).  
38 For example, the colony of Georgia did not establish the Church of England in its initial 
charter. Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church–State Relations in Colonial 
and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1693, 1704-05 (2005). 
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colonists to be a handy tool, first in rebellion and then in arguing for 
disestablishment.39 The arrival of formal disestablishment, therefore, was in 
one sense a settling device—rendering official and mandatory a religious 
compromise based on the erosion of the official power of the King’s church, 
which at base had been associated with the King’s blessing. In other ways, 
disestablishment was unsettling, for it did not spell out what should happen 
after the rupture with longstanding tradition. To fill the yawning gap 
between the ideology of disestablishment and the need for organization, 
American legislatures did what they often did—they “borrowed” English 
precedent, but they modified the tradition, molding it to their own tastes 
and interests.40  
Disestablishment thus generally had a more benign aspect in America 
than in France. This was in part due to the relative weakness of establish-
ment in some colonies even before the Revolution, and in part due to the 
citation to ancient limits on religious property in English law. In America, 
one could be a loyal congregant of an existing and flourishing church and a 
keen supporter of disestablishment. Isaac Backus of Massachusetts, a 
Baptist, saw disestablishment as the only way to be a true Christian, and 
advocated for that position through decades of activism and commentary in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.41 
It is worth noting, however, that powerful corporations were not widely 
admired in the Revolutionary era or after. Anticorporate feeling—grounded 
not only in mortmain but also in the traditional monopolies accorded to 
religious and lay corporations under English law—survived well into the 
nineteenth century.42 During the same period, the incorporation of reli-
gious societies of small means and deeply local scope became a way for state 
legislators to serve their constituents, who were members of these new 
societies. These relatively nonthreatening organizations stood in sharp 
contrast to more dangerous corporations. Banks, including the Second Bank 
of the United States and predecessor organizations, bribed and substantially 
rewarded supportive legislators. The backlash against financial corporations, 
 
39 For a discussion of anti–Church of England rhetoric in the buildup to the American Revo-
lution, see Gordon, supra note 14, at 13-19. For treatments characterizing the French Revolution as 
more radical, especially with regard to religion (but also to corporations), see generally NIGEL 
ASTON, RELIGION AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, 1780–1804 (2000); WILLIAM H. SEWELL, 
JR., WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE OLD 
REGIME TO 1848 (1980). 
40 For other examples of such borrowing, see Gordon, supra note 12, at 683, 696, on the United 
States’ adoption of English blasphemy jurisprudence. 
41 William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and State in America, 73 
AM. HIST. REV. 1392, 1403-04 (1968).  
42 See generally Maier, supra note 31, at 58-64. 
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especially after the Panic of 1837, portrayed banks as great sources of 
tyranny and corruption.43 By the 1830s, railroads joined banks as targets of 
anticorporate tirades, which centered on the erosion of democracy at the 
hands of moneyed interests.44  
The focus on the corruption of wealth and the dangers of concentrated 
authority in corporations found some adherents, even when applied to 
churches instead of banks. In Virginia, anticorporate and antiecclesiastical 
sentiments blended so thoroughly that, between 1790 and 2002, religious 
organizations were formally prohibited from incorporating.45 James Madi-
son was especially virulent on the question; while President, Madison 
vetoed a special bill to incorporate a church in Washington.46 Most states 
did not follow Virginia’s lead, however.47 Instead, they adapted the corpo-
rate form to empower the laity, giving congregants the right to control 
 
43 See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 503 (2007) (noting the Democrats publicly blamed the 
banks for the Panic of 1837); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 32-44 (1970) (document-
ing nineteenth-century fears that corporations would upset the balance of power in the markets); 
Maier, supra note 31, at 71-72 (“Charges that corporations corrupted the political system became 
commonplace during the 1830s after the Second Bank of the United States bestowed substantial 
favors on Congressmen in an effort to have its charter renewed.”).  
44 See, e.g., 6 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 554 (Harrisburg, Benjamin Singerly 1873) (statement of Rep. Kaine) (remarking 
that railroads are chartered to serve the people, yet operate for “the exclusive benefit of the 
corporations themselves”); 7 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 87-90 (Harrisburg, Packer, Barrett & Parks 1838) 
(statement of Rep. Ingersoll) (blaming banks for social ills such as class division and rural 
poverty); Maier, supra note 31, at 68 (summarizing criticisms of corporations as destructive to 
democracy). 
45 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 23-27; An Act to Repeal the Act for Incorporating the 
Protestant Episcopal Church and for Other Purposes, 12 VA. STAT. ch. 12, at 266-67 (1786) 
(Hening 1823); see also VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14 (repealed 2006) (“The General Assembly shall 
not grant a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination, but may secure the 
title to church property to an extent to be limited by law.”); H.J. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 129 (1910) (“The repeal of the incorporation act definitely 
marks the separation of church and state in Virginia.”). See generally BUCKLEY, supra note 8, at 
144-72; G. MacLaren Brydon, The Antiecclesiastical Laws of Virginia, 64 VA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 259 (1956). A federal lawsuit by the Reverend Jerry Falwell finally toppled the old 
rule, although the teeth of the prohibition had long been pulled by judicial doctrine recognizing 
trustees as empowered to control the property of unincorporated religious organizations. Falwell v. 
Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 632 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
46 For Madison’s veto message overturning “An Act Incorporating the Protestant Episcopal 
Church,” see H. JOURNAL, 11th Cong., 3d Sess. 566-67 (1811). 
47 Justice Joseph Story criticized Virginia’s disestablishmentarian excesses, stating that the 
influence of French radicalism in the state legislature had led to dangerous denials of all religious 
property, a precedent that could be (but fortunately had not been) extended to undermine title to 
all property. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50-52 (1815).  
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religious societies through incorporation statutes that secured property (in 
limited amounts) and required the election of trustees to manage all 
corporate assets. 
The first disestablishment, therefore, featured state imposition of strin-
gent economic discipline on clerics and denominations. This was matched 
by deference to individual religious choices and a relative disregard in the 
broader society for the ways that religious authority and wealth had tradi-
tionally worked together. The combination of both discipline and privilege 
through incorporation often resulted in unexpected and, to modern eyes, 
shockingly invasive practices. Frequent judicial interpretation of those laws 
meant that the internal workings of religious organizations were exposed to 
scrutiny and judgment in thousands of conflicts that pitted the faithful 
against each other and against their ministers and priests.48 In the nine-
teenth century, judges were heard to remark blithely that “mere money” 
should not concern a minister or his congregation. In comparison to the 
immeasurable value of freedom of conscience, the inconvenience of, say, 
losing a church building was a minor affair, observed the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court.49 Furthermore, judges often inquired into religious 
doctrine to decide questions of church polity, all in the interests of manag-
ing the boundaries of religious property in a disestablished world. As Justice 
Strong noted, entirely without irony, almost all cases of note involved 
“church property,” which required courts to decide on the proper disposition 
of disputed land and monies.50 
Attention to this extensive legal record reveals the tracks of religious life 
left in law, as well as the state’s imposition of discipline on religious actors. 
Vibrant religious communities flourished, paradoxically enough, in these 
highly regulated and even brittle institutions. In quotidian and often bitter 
controversies over church property and identity, Americans delineated what 
disestablishment meant (and did not mean) in practice. These battles pitted 
believers against each other; the byproduct was a jurisprudence of disestab-
lishment created through, rather than in opposition to, the legal system. 
The first system of disestablishment thus involved extensive government 
regulation. Recent historical work on state and local governments in the 
early nineteenth century has challenged earlier historians’ claims that there 
 
48 THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: JEFFERSON’S STAT-
UTE IN VIRGINIA 117, 128, 141-43 (2013); cf. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH 
AND STATE 130 (2002) (arguing that supporters of disestablishment elevated politics to the level 
of religion). 
49 See Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488, 521-22 (1820) (“[A]n inconvenience of this [financial] sort 
will never be felt, when a case of conscience is in question.”). 
50 STRONG, supra note 22, at 40. 
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was a vacuum of authority.51 The historiography of religion has been less 
attentive to the role of the state, but both legislation and litigation reveal 
active government intervention. Connecting this pattern of regulation and 
oversight to religious institutions and their congregants allows religious 
historians to see a different landscape, one that reflects American political 
and legal development more generally. In addition, attention to the early 
implementation of disestablishment gives legal scholars of religion a new 
vantage point. Instead of relying on abstract statements in congressional 
debates or at the national constitutional convention, we can study the actual 
practice of disestablishment in the states. The resulting portrait of the 
protection and regulation of religious institutions is both unexpected and 
far more wide-ranging than we knew.  
Disestablishment in early America was the result of innovation and ad-
aptation. State legislatures did not import the world of the Henrician 
reformation when they established property limits for religion, pace Justice 
Strong.52 Instead, states blended provisions for general incorporation with 
property limitations and lay governance. Strong addressed his lectures to an 
audience in New York City, where the Episcopalian Trinity Church of Wall 
Street was (and still is) a major landholder.53 In 1875 New York, religious 
corporations were allowed to hold land for “pious uses” only and, for most 
religious denominations, the annual income from both real and personal 
 
51 William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 766-67 
(2008), argues that government in America has been sprawling yet intensely localistic, a pattern 
that broadly fits disestablishment and the incorporation statutes this Article examines, but that 
does not capture the partial delegation of authority contained in general incorporation statutes. It 
is also worth noting that, over time, the discipline eroded and the privilege extended, especially for 
religious corporations. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Tax Exemp-
tions and the Growth of Government Support for Religion in the Late Nineteenth Century (n.d.) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (documenting the rapid increase in church wealth 
and power after the Civil War). Yet Novak’s central claim is a valuable corrective. For a related 
qualification of Novak’s argument, see generally Gary Gerstle, A State Both Strong and Weak, 115 
AM. HIST. REV. 779 (2010), which argues that the U.S. government’s reluctance to restrict the 
influence of corporations and markets is as characteristic of U.S. history as the assertion of state 
power. In addition, see generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: 
LEGAL CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-
REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (2009), which asserts that localism survived without substantial 
change into the third decade of the nineteenth century. Edwards’s study, however, does not 
address the key role of religion in the maintenance of social discipline.  
52 See STRONG, supra note 22, at 17-21. 
53 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 17; Elizabeth Mensch, Religion, Revival, and the Ruling Class: A 
Critical History of Trinity Church, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 427, 429, 566 (1987). For Trinity Church’s 
current holdings, see TRINITY WALL STREET, http://www.trinitywallstreet.org/about/realestate 
(last visited Dec. 6, 2013). 
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property was limited to $3000 per church.54 Individual Presbyterian and 
Episcopal churches in New York City, whose congregants hailed from the 
higher reaches of society, were allowed incomes of $6000.55 These income 
limits varied considerably: in New York in 1784, each church was allotted 
£1200; in Pennsylvania in 1791, the limit was £500; in North Carolina in 
1796, £200.56 Yet the ubiquity and longevity of such restrictions reflected a 
political consensus.  
This consensus was reached in response to the quandaries created by 
disestablishment. After deciding to disestablish, states faced a central 
question: What to do with religious wealth, property, and institutional 
forms after religious groups ceased to be either part of the broader appa-
ratus of government or more or less unwelcome dissenters? Following the 
pioneering work of anthropologist and political scientist James Scott, we can 
understand how states sought to make religious life “legible” at the outset of 
an unprecedented era of disestablishment.57 What did it mean to “see” the 
religious landscape from the perspective of a disestablished state?58 What 
map would allow government both to describe and regulate its constituents 
and territory?59 In our case, the question is further complicated by the fact 
that federalism consigned such questions to the states rather than the 
national government; each state wrestled with similar but separate questions 
about the meaning of disestablishment. The states’ commitment to disestab-
lish meant that the ground had shifted, and governments adapted to account 
for and, in turn, manage the change. 
Recognizing the rough outlines of the religious uses of the landscape 
provided young state governments with a roadmap, as it were. They had 
enough information to construct a regulatory regime that we know in 
retrospect was at once grossly inadequate and deeply productive. Inade-
quate, because a one-size-fits-all regime of property and governance could 
not account for the many differing ways of observing and anchoring faith in 
American society. Productive, paradoxically enough, because the one-size-
fits-all structure was deployed so widely and frequently that most religious 
 
54 R.H. TYLER, AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW: THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS SOCIE-
TIES, CHURCH GOVERNMENT AND CREEDS, DISTURBING RELIGIOUS MEETINGS, AND 
THE LAW OF BURIAL GROUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES 112 (Albany, William Gould 1866). 
55 Id. 
56 Act of Apr. 6, 1784, 1784 N.Y. LAWS ch. 18, at 613-18; N.C. ACTS ch. 11, at 93 (1796); Act 
of Apr. 6, 1791, § 4, 1790–1791 PA. ACTS ch. 27, at 42-43. 
57 JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE 
THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 49-51 (1998). 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
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groups adjusted their expectations; many new congregations emerged and 
then resided in a legal world where they expected religious organizations to 
fit the regulatory structures imposed by the disestablished state.  
Limitations on total acreage or value of property (or annual income for a 
religious corporation) were common elements of this new regulatory map. 
Both kinds of allowances gradually became more generous—permitting 
larger acreage, especially in newer western states, or greater income in later 
decades—but the desirability of these restrictions was widely accepted. 
Such limitations varied: one acre,60 two acres,61 three acres,62 four acres,63 
five acres,64 ten acres,65 twenty acres,66 and forty acres.67 Other jurisdictions 
simply restricted religious organizations to as much property as was used for 
the purpose of “public worship”68 or “for the use of the society,”69 or else 
mandated that the property be used “for no secular purposes.”70 In addition, 
especially later in the antebellum period, some states added limits on the 
maximum annual income produced by real or personal property, such as 
$400,71 $900,72 $1000,73 $2000,74 $3000,75 $5000,76 $6000,77 $20,000,78 or on the 
total value of real property, such as $50,000.79 
 
60 See Act of Dec. 22, 1840, § 1, 1840 IOWA LAWS 9, 9-10. California allowed religious organ-
izations to hold four lots in a town or city and twenty acres in the country. Act of April 22, 1850, 
CAL. DIGEST OF LAWS ch. 6, § 182, at 57 (Wood 1857).  
61 See Act of Jan. 8, 1803, § 8, 1802–1803 MD. LAWS ch. 111; 1854 N.C. REV. CODE ch. 97,  
§ 2, at 500 (Moore & Biggs 1855); VA. CODE tit. 22, ch. 77, § 12, at 363 (1849); see also D.C. 
Organic Act of 1801, § 1, 2 STAT. 103, 103-05 (incorporating the laws of Virginia and Maryland 
respectively). 
62 An Act to Secure Religious Societies Within this Territory in the Possession of Their 
Churches, and Other Property, § 2, 1838–1839 WIS. STAT. 136, 136. 
63 Act of Feb. 1, 1814, 1813–1814 KY. ACTS ch. 164, at 211-12. 
64 GA. DIGEST OF LAWS 1070 (Cobb 1851); Act effective Mar. 1, 1835, § 1, 1834–1835 ILL. 
LAWS 147, 147; Acts of Apr. 16, 1838, and July 2, 1839, PA. LAWS. §§ 73–74, at 942 (Purdon & 
Brightly 1862); Act of Jan. 17, 1844, 1843–1844 TENN. ACTS ch. 110, at 138. 
65 1846–1847 FLA. ACTS ch. 84, § 38, at 36; see also Act of Jan. 30, 1845, § 5, TEX. DIGEST 
OF GEN. STAT. LAWS, art. 2066, at 444 (Oldham & White 1859) (exempting up to ten acres 
from taxation). 
66 Act of Feb. 5, 1819, § 3, 1818–1819 OHIO ACTS ch. 54, at 121. 
67 Act of Dec. 7, 1837, § 1, 1837 ARK. REV. STAT. 657, 657-58 (Ball & Roane 1838). 
68 Act of Feb. 12, 1858, § 4, 1858 KAN. LAWS ch. 66, at 350; see also Act of Apr. 1, 1834, 1834 
MASS. LAWS ch. 183, § 7, at 268; 1839 VT. REV. STAT. ch. 81, § 13, at 394. 
69 1854 N.C. REV. CODE ch. 97, § 2, at 500 (Moore & Biggs 1855). 
70 1 MICH. COMP. LAWS ch. 68, § 9, at 662 (Cooley 1857). 
71 Id. § 3, at 500 (setting limit for any single church). 
72 DEL. REV. STAT. ch. 39, § 11, at 106 (1852). 
73 Act of Dec. 22, 1840, § 1, 1840 IOWA LAWS 9, 9-10; Act of July 3, 1827, 1827 N.H. LAWS 
ch. 36, at 186. 
74 1860 MD. CODE art. 26, § 89, at 116. 
75 1857 ME. REV. STAT. ch. 12, § 3, at 196; MINN. PUB. STAT. ch. 17, § 21, at 280 (Sher-
burne & Hollinshead 1859); 1858 WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 66, § 8, at 419. 
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In return for the protections of the corporate form, these statutes paired 
such limits on wealth and land with other forms of regulation, especially 
mandatory forms for internal governance. Like the property restrictions, the 
legislative stipulations for church polity were simple and followed a rough 
pattern. In virtually all statutes, state legislatures imposed regimes of lay 
governance. Control of all property and funds was placed in the hands of 
congregants, not clergy. New Jersey’s 1786 statute, for example, required 
religious societies to elect up to seven trustees, selected by and from the 
congregation of the organization.80  Other states varied the number of 
trustees, ranging from three to fifteen in most cases.81 Some states, such as 
New York, limited the vote for trustees to adult men.82 The key goal, clearly, 
was to place control in those who were elected by their fellow church 
members, thereby implicitly limiting the power of clergy, and even denom-
inations, to impose on congregations conditions to which they had not 
agreed. By passing general incorporation statutes for religious societies, 
states forcibly democratized and laicized church governance. 
B. Incorporated Societies 
From one perspective, the regulation imposed on religious societies in 
return for incorporation was overwhelmingly restrictive, emanating from 
mistrust of mortmain institutions. Equally important, however, was the 
empowerment of institutional life associated with the corporate form. 
Religious corporation statutes were not restricted as to faith tradition or 
denomination; instead, they extended security of property and state recog-
nition in return for material restrictions. The effects of disestablishment 
occurred not just in such statutes, but also in the very forms that religious 
organizations took under the new laws.  
In some ways, religious corporations were the wave of the future for all 
of corporate law. Long before other private groups were allowed the privi-
lege, religious societies were offered incorporation under general statutes. 
Such legislation provided a simple means of securing corporate status, 
 
76 PA. DIGEST OF LAWS 145-46 (Purdon & Brightly 1862). 
77 1854 N.C. REV. CODE ch. 97, § 3, at 500 (Moore & Biggs 1855) (setting limit for churches 
or denominations). 
78 Act of Apr. 22, 1850, CAL. DIGEST OF LAWS ch. 6, § 182, at 57 (Wood 1857). 
79 Act of July 1, 1862, § 3, 12 Stat. 501, 501-02 (1862) (imposing the limit on federal territo-
ries); ALA. CODE § 1262, at 275 (Ormond, Bagby & Goldthwaite 1852); 1857–1858 TENN. CODE 
§ 1472, at 319 (Meigs & Cooper 1858). 
80 Act of Mar. 16, 1786, § 1, 1785–1786 N.J. ACTS ch. 129, § 1, at 255-56. 
81 See infra note 136. 
82 Act of Apr. 5, 1813, § 1, 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. 292, 292-93 (1829). 
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whereas incorporation for turnpikes, bridges, canals, and—eventually—early 
railroads, as well as all business, manufacturing, and financial ventures, was 
obtainable by special legislative charter only. General incorporation statutes 
for religious organizations dating from the late eighteenth century have led 
some business law scholars to claim that business corporations as we know 
them today are the descendants of the 1784 New York statute, for example.83 
Through incorporation, separation of church and state (if the phrase is 
anywhere appropriate) entailed freedom of conscience from state control, 
not freedom of institutional religion from state oversight. Matters of the 
spirit were no longer within the purview of the government, but things of 
the world that belonged to churches—land, money, and control over both—
remained of deep interest to disestablished states. And the corporate form 
itself also affected the development of American religion.84 Corporations 
became vectors for the channeling of religious energies, imposing structure, 
procedures, and privileges (as well as discipline) on religious societies. The 
prospect of such protection drew religious institutions and their members to 
the law and the powers it promised, as the new legal world for religious 
organizations meshed with and ultimately directed the course of religious 
life. As one corporate law scholar noted in another context, “[T]he law 
provided leverage at points critical to other development, and its marginal 
effects could determine the balance . . . to fix our direction and the pace at 
which we moved.”85 Among the most important of these leverage points was 
the power to hold property and the duty to use it in carefully confined ways. 
1. The Nature of “Religious Property” 
In the name of disestablishment, general incorporation laws imposed 
property restrictions on all denominations, not just those that had enjoyed 
the King’s favor before independence. State statutes limiting religious 
property tended to be written simply, focusing on total accumulation, rather 
than the niceties of religious doctrine. These new laws thus generated 
 
83 See Act of Apr. 6, 1784, 1784 N.Y. LAWS ch. 18, at 613; RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORI-
GINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–1855, at 6 (1982); Liam Séamus 
O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 201, 216-20 (2006); Kellen Funk, This Stone Which I Erect Shall Be a House of God: 
Disestablishment and Religious Corporations in New York, 1784–1854, at 4, 8-10 ( June 15, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
84 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that a corporation is “invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 
(1819). Yet the corporation and its relationship to public, as well as private, religious life was 
ubiquitous and influenced government in visible and tangible ways. 
85 HURST, supra note 43, at 11-12. 
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another layer of state involvement, as state judiciaries were called upon to 
fill in the details of the law of religious corporations, as well as to decide 
how and when trustees had exceeded their power to control church polity. 
State judges decided cases that grew out of squabbles among congregants, 
many of which devolved into litigation and, with distressing predictability, 
into outright schism. Such lawsuits generally pitted the self-proclaimed 
“orthodox” members of a congregation (or an entire denomination) against 
reformers of one stripe or another. In these cases, judges tackled the 
question head-on with surprising alacrity, deciding whether a given body 
had betrayed the fundamental precepts of the underlying faith and awarding 
the property to the party they found most deserving. When religious 
doctrine conflicted with state legislation limiting religious property, however, 
judges often did not hesitate to invalidate deeds of transfer, no matter what 
the faith demanded.  
North Carolina, for example, enacted legislation in 1796 that provided 
for incorporation and continuity of property ownership for religious 
institutions; that is, current property, including glebe lands, could be 
retained.86 But looking forward, North Carolina imposed a stricter disci-
pline. In addition to total limits on property (which could not generate 
income above £200 annually),87 the statute prohibited religious societies and 
their trustees from acquiring any property unless it was “for the sole use” of 
the society.88 In other words, North Carolina limited religious societies’ 
ability to accumulate wealth even as it empowered their formation. 
In 1827, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that this limitation 
invalidated the purchase of slaves by a religious society.89 It was most 
certainly not the case that North Carolina prohibited a religious entity from 
owning slaves; the problem here was that the alleged “purchaser” was the 
corporation known as the Trustees of the Quaker Society of Contentnea, 
and the seller was a member of the congregation. The agreement of sale was 
designed as a means of emancipation (or at least of allowing slaves to live in 
a condition of substantial freedom and security until they might be manu-
mitted legally).90 Because a religious association was only allowed to hold 
property by grace of the state’s 1796 statute, the court held, it was also 
 
86 Act of 1796, 2 N.C. PUB. ACTS ch. 11, at 93 (Martin 1804). 
87 Id. § 1, at 93. 
88 Id. § 2, at 93. 
89 Trs. of the Quaker Soc’y of Contentnea v. Dickenson, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 189 (1827). The case 
actually began at least five years earlier. John Spencer Bassett, Slavery in the State of North Carolina, 
in 17 ECONOMIC HISTORY—MARYLAND AND THE SOUTH 317, 384 n.1 (Herbert B. Adams ed., 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press 1899). 
90 Dickenson, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 190. 
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constrained by the mandate outlined in that legislation—religious societies 
could only hold property for their own “use and benefit.”91 In a similar case, a 
bequest in 1799 left slaves to four trustees, one of whom was a Methodist 
minister.92 The slaves were to be kept “for the glory of God, and good of 
said slaves.”93 When more than two decades later the court determined that 
the bequest was actually a veiled emancipation device, it was voided as 
contrary to law.94 
In Trustees of the Quaker Society of Contentnea v. Dickenson, the Quaker 
Society’s evident desire to emancipate the slaves whenever possible—and to 
pay them wages in the meantime—meant that this property was held for the 
benefit of the property itself (that is, the slaves), rather than for the socie-
ty’s use. The conveyance was voided,95 and the “sale” for manumission soon 
atrophied as a Quaker antislavery strategy. In 1830, some 652 slaves had 
been freed by this device, and 402 more were under Quaker trustees’ care.96 
But by 1856, thanks in large part to litigation surrounding the practice, 
Quakers had reduced their investment in trustee purchases to a tiny fraction 
of the sums spent a generation earlier, and only eighteen slaves were under 
Quaker care.97  
As the lone dissenting judge in Dickenson noted, it was extraordinary to 
inquire into what a private purchaser intended to do with property that an 
owner had a legal right to sell.98 Such an inquiry was an offense against the 
rights of property owners and purchasers. The corporate form established 
for religious societies, however, allowed the North Carolina court to probe 
purchases, sales, and donations in religious institutions more deeply than 
elsewhere in the antebellum economy. The mandate to limit property only 
to that used for “religious” purposes—worship, interment, the support of a 
minister, assistance to impoverished members, and the like—became the 
catalyst for decisions denying property rights to religious organizations 
 
91 Id. at 200. 
92 Huckaby v. Jones, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 120, 120-21 (1822). 
93 Id. 
94 Id.; see also Thompson v. Newlin, 38 N.C. 388 (3 Ired. Eq.) 338, 340-41 (1844) (voiding as 
against public policy deeds and wills which attempted to emancipate slaves); Stevens v. Ely, 16 
N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 493, 493-94, 497-98 (1830) (voiding a contract to sell slaves into partial slavery); 
Haywood v. Craven’s Ex’rs, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 360, 367 (1816) (voiding a bequest that 
contemplated emancipation); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 
1619–1860, at 400-02 (1996) (describing North Carolina courts’ hostility to “quasi-emancipation”).  
95 Dickenson, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 190-91, 203. 
96 STEPHEN B. WEEKS, SOUTHERN QUAKERS AND SLAVERY: A STUDY IN INSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 228 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press 1896). 
97 Id. 
98 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 206-07 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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under a variety of different statutory schemes. Freedom of religion thus 
went hand-in-hand with widespread denial of the capacity of religious 
organizations to acquire the wealth that had sustained traditional forms of 
religious authority. In return for incorporation, the state demanded that 
religious societies bow to the state’s policies through the mechanism of 
property limitations. Such mechanisms, the Quakers learned, could be 
punitive. 
Admittedly, Quakers were small and embattled in North Carolina when 
Dickenson was decided in 1827, and so an invasive judicial decision might not 
be felt among more popular groups. But the growth among Baptists in the 
early Republic was stunning. Between 1775 and 1825, Baptists went from 
dissenting minority to powerful evangelical mainstay.99 They too found that 
property limits imposed by statute constrained their liberty. In Maryland, 
the first state constitution in 1776 disestablished the Church of England 
(and preserved its current property), but also provided that the legislature 
had to approve all sales or donations of land to religious organizations.100 
Furthermore, all such property had to be smaller than two acres in size and 
explicitly dedicated only “for a church, meeting, or other house of worship 
[or] for a burying ground.”101 In Grove v. Trustees of the Congregation of the 
Disciples of Jesus Christ, a sale of just under two acres of land in trust for “the 
only proper use and behoof of the said German Baptist Society” (also 
known as the “Brethren” or simply the “Dunkers”) in 1787 resulted in the 
 
99 HOWE, supra note 43, at 180-82. 
100 MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, arts. XXXIII & XXXIV. 
101 Id. art. XXXIV; see also Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566, 583 (1829) (noting Mary-
land’s two-acre maximum). The amount was raised to five acres in the 1867 Maryland constitution’s 
Declaration of Rights, eventually vacated in 1948, and repealed entirely in 1977. MD. DECLARA-
TION OF RIGHTS of 1867, art. XXXVIII (repealed 1977). Several states also imposed limits on the 
percentage of a decedent’s estate that could be left to a religious institution and the length of time 
that must have elapsed between the execution of a will and the time of death. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 
22, 1858, § 6, IOWA REV. STAT. § 1198, at 203 (1860) (setting a maximum contribution of twenty-
five percent of the estate for decedents leaving a surviving wife, child, or parent); Act of April 26, 
1855, 1855 PA. LAWS ch. 347, § 11, at 332 (requiring completion of will or deed at least one month 
before death). Such statutes generally were defended as means to protect families against 
“improvident” or “enfeebled” testators. Such bequests were not automatically void, but could be 
challenged at the election of heirs or next of kin. Kristine S. Knaplund, Charity for the “Death Tax”: 
The Impact of Legislation on Charitable Bequests, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 713, 726-28 (2010). Yet the 
message, especially when paired with widespread property restrictions, was one grounded in 
suspicion of the actions and motives of churchmen.  
Scholars specializing in trust and estate law frequently and mistakenly assume that the category 
“mortmain” is composed entirely of such testamentary restrictions. See, e.g., John R. Cunningham, 
Mortmain Statutes: The Dead Hand Still Survives, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 49, 49 (1990) (“Mortmain 
statutes . . . limit testamentary transfers to religious and charitable organizations.”); Shirley 
Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 407, 408 (1992). 
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establishment of a cemetery on the land and intermittent worship.102 But in 
1808, the same grantor rewrote the deed, allowing the trustees at their 
discretion to permit members of other sects to be buried there in addition 
to Dunkers, and to permit members of other faiths to use the site for 
worship either together with or in place of the Dunkers.103  
The whole thing blew up when a rival evangelical group, the Disciples 
of Christ—which began as a movement within the Baptist tradition but split 
off in the late 1820s amid growing tension with more mainstream Bap-
tists104—laid claim to the land.105 The Disciples had leased the land from the 
trustees in return for the promise to build a church; eventually they decided 
that sharing space with the Dunkers no longer suited their interests. The 
issue was joined as antagonism between the older, more traditional group 
and the newcomers boiled over.106  
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the initial grant was void: 
even though the Dunkers had used the land for more than twenty years, the 
gift had not vested, because they had not sought the approval of the legisla-
ture.107 The court then decided that the lessee religious corporation had 
acted in good faith reliance on the subsequent grant—they had built a solid 
house of worship and a brick vault for interment of the dead, and they had 
paid all taxes and assessments.108 Thus the Disciples’ interest had ripened 
into a relationship that equity would not disturb.109 As in this case, the 
uncertainty of title, where legislative approval was technically required for 
each sale or lease, made for constant litigation, and courts struggled to 
untangle often well-meaning but clumsy attempts to satisfy (or circumvent) 
the law.110 
Some states focused more on the ways that religious organizations might 
abuse the generosity of donors to the detriment of the congregation and 
therefore regulated how church property could be sold or mortgaged. Maine 
 
102 33 Md. 451, 452 (1871). See generally DONALD B. KRAYBILL & CARL F. BOWMAN, ON 
THE BACKROAD TO HEAVEN: OLD ORDER HUTTERITES, MENNONITES, AMISH, AND 
BRETHREN (2001). 
103 Grove, 33 Md. at 454-55.  
104 See generally M.M. DAVIS, HOW THE DISCIPLES BEGAN AND GREW: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (1915). 
105 Grove, 33 Md. at 452-53. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 454. 
108 Id. at 456-58. 
109 Id. 
110 E.g., Rogers v. Sisters of Charity of St. Joseph, 97 Md. 550, 554 (1903) (holding that the 
establishment of a trust in a religious society to benefit an orphan asylum, where no trustee duties 
were specified, actually vested fee simple in the asylum). 
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stipulated that prior appraisal “by three discreet persons under oath, to be 
elected by ballot at any legal meeting of [the] owners or proprietors” was 
required before a religious corporation could sell any assets.111 In Warren v. 
Inhabitants of Stetson, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine invalidated a 
transfer of land that had only two of three required signers on the deed.112 
Michigan placed no formal limit on the amount of land, but mandated 
judicial approval of any sale by a religious group.113 Georgia set a cap on total 
property and further limited property ownership to what was “absolutely 
necessary to carry into effect the objects of [a group’s] incorporation.”114  
New York State was the largest jurisdiction to require ongoing judicial 
administration of religious property. The state provided particular rules for 
individual denominations, including Episcopal, Presbyterian, Reformed 
Dutch, Dutch Reformed, Free, Quaker, Roman Catholic, and Shaker, 
together with elaborate rules for the election of trustees by these and other, 
smaller religious groups, hiring and firing of ministers and priests, purchase 
of real estate (overseen by courts), the mandate that all title to property 
vested in the corporation rather than individuals, and so on. Many smaller 
societies in the state were limited to a maximum income of $1000 per year as 
late as the 1840s.115 New York also required court approval for any sale or 
mortgage of real property, an onerous impediment designed to protect the 
wishes of donors against the machinations of clerics, and productive of 
much litigation.116  
2. The Law of Religious Property and Lay Governance 
The new law of religion nourished and channeled enormous change in 
the American legal system and religious life. For the most part, this was 
private law, tucked into state codes and worked out in case law by state 
judges. The results varied, but most state judiciaries, like their legislative 
counterparts, found themselves addressing questions of ownership, control, 
 
111 Act of March 16, 1855, § 2, 1855 ME. ACTS 196, 197. 
112 30 Me. 231, 235 (1849). 
113 Act of Feb. 13, 1855, § 19, 1855 MICH. LAWS 313, 317. 
114 Act of Dec. 28, 1843, §§ 1–2, 1843 GA. ACTS 108, 108. 
115 For a useful summary of regulations imposed by New York State on specific denomina-
tions, see TYLER, supra note 54, at 59-90. For current regulation by denomination, see N.Y. 
RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 40–437 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 2012). 
116 See, e.g., De Ruyter v. St. Peter’s Church, 3 N.Y. 238, 239, 243 (1850) (holding that vice-
chancellor’s approval of a mortgage meant that the church was liable for the debt); Freligh v. Platt, 
5 Cow. 494, 496 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (holding that a sale of pews was not a sale of real estate and 
did not require court approval); TYLER, supra note 54, at 59-140 (detailing New York’s religious 
laws). By the mid-twentieth century, specific statutory language existed for thirty-five separate 
denominations. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 31, at 1534. 
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and dissolution for religious corporations. For religious societies in the few 
states that disallowed incorporation, judge-made doctrines of trust law 
followed the rough patterns laid out by states with formal incorporation 
statutes. 
This ongoing judicial management was as important as the legislation 
governing it. The rules that courts developed to guide religious institutions 
differed on some issues but agreed on many others. Courts disagreed, for 
example, over whether a donation or purchase in excess of an allowed 
amount was automatically void or merely voidable if the transaction was 
challenged. 117  Regardless, the existence of such restrictions must have 
discouraged many potential donors, especially those who sought legal 
advice.  
Less sophisticated actors frequently were frustrated when they tried to 
use the law to accomplish their own objectives. For instance, Illinois limited 
religious corporations to a total of five acres of real property in the mid-
1830s.118 Mormon Church founder Joseph Smith, who together with his 
followers had established the city of Nauvoo on the banks of the Mississippi 
River near Carthage in 1839, took advantage of Illinois’s 1835 “Act Concern-
ing Religious Societies,” which set the five-acre limit on church property in 
the state.119 In an effort to disentangle his personal finances from those of 
the church he led, Smith was named “trustee in trust” and empowered to 
acquire, manage, and dispose of all real and personal property for the 
Church of Latter-day Saints.120 Smith and his wife then transferred from 
his personal accounts about 240 city lots, totaling 300 acres, to himself as 
trustee.121  
At roughly the same time, Smith declared bankruptcy.122 He listed 
among his debts a sum of roughly $5000 to the U.S. government, represent-
ing a note on which he stood as surety for the purchase of a steamboat on 
which the principals had defaulted.123 Litigation on both the bankruptcy and 
 
117 See infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text. 
118 Act of Feb. 6, 1835, § 1, 1835 ILL. LAWS 147, 147. 
119 Id. 
120 Dallin H. Oaks & Joseph I. Bentley, Joseph Smith and Legal Process: In the Wake of the 
Steamboat Nauvoo, 1976 BYU L. REV. 735, 745-46. 
121 Id. at 749. 
122 GLEN M. LEONARD, NAUVOO: A PLACE OF PEACE, A PEOPLE OF PROMISE 168-69 
(2002). 
123 See FAWN MCKAY BRODIE, NO MAN KNOWS MY HISTORY: THE LIFE OF JOSEPH 
SMITH 266 (2d ed. 1971) (listing Smith’s debts upon his declaration of bankruptcy in 1842); 
RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, JOSEPH SMITH: ROUGH STONE ROLLING 433-34 (2005). See 
generally ROBERT BRUCE FLANDERS, NAUVOO: KINGDOM ON THE MISSISSIPPI 168-71 
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the note had not been resolved by the time Smith was murdered in 1844.124 
After years of wrangling, a federal court held that the transfer of anything in 
excess of ten acres from Smith to the church was void under Illinois law.125 
Hundreds of acres thus stayed in Smith’s estate and could be seized for 
satisfaction of the debt, subject only to his widow’s dower interest.126  
Three decades later, Catharine Germain donated her eighty-acre farm in 
St. Clair County, Illinois, to St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Congregation.127 
Her son Nicholas refused to leave the valuable tract of land, and the church 
brought suit to eject him as a trespasser.128 At the Illinois Supreme Court, 
the majority held that ownership of the land had never changed hands 
because the church already owned the maximum ten acres before Cath-
arine’s gift129: “[A]ll conveyances . . . made in violation of this prohibition, 
are absolutely void.”130  
By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, a minority of state 
courts, beginning with Pennsylvania in 1821, held that title to property 
acquired in excess of statutory maximums was good against everyone but 
the state.131 Justice Craig, dissenting in St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Congrega-
tion v. Germain, argued that the question of whether a religious corporation 
had exceeded its power when accepting land was one for the state alone, and 
that an injured relative such as Nicholas had no interest in the farm: “The 
question is one between the corporation and the sovereign power, in which 
individuals have no concern.”132  
The issue, of course, was whether the restrictions on property ownership 
imposed on religious organizations were undertaken fundamentally to 
 
(1965); M. Hamlin Cannon, Bankruptcy Proceedings against Joseph Smith in Illinois, 14 PAC. HIST. 
REV. 425 (1945) (collecting correspondence detailing Smith’s bankruptcy proceedings). 
124 See generally JOHN C. BENNETT, THE HISTORY OF THE SAINTS: OR, AN EXPOSÉ 
OF JOE SMITH AND MORMONISM 96-98 (Univ. of Illinois Press 3d ed. 2000) (1842) (providing 
additional background on the bankruptcy litigation). 
125 Oaks & Bentley, supra note 120, at 773-78. By 1845, the state had increased the amount of 
property a church could hold to ten acres. Act of Mar. 3, 1845, § 44, 1844–1845 ILL. REV. STAT. 111, 
120. 
126 Id. 
127 St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Congregation v. Germain, 104 Ill. 440, 443 (1882). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 447. 
130 Id. at 446. 
131 See, e.g., Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Rawle 313, 318-22 (Pa. 1821). For analogous reason-
ing regarding secular organizations, see generally Arthur M. Alger, Consequences of Illegal or Ultra 
Vires Acquisition of Real Estate by a Corporation, 8 HARV. L. REV. 15 (1894). 
132 Germain, 104 Ill. at 448 (Craig, J., dissenting); see also De Camp v. Dobbins, 31 N.J. Eq. 
671, 688-96 (1879) (holding religious society that already held maximum amount of property 
allowed by statute could not receive a charitable bequest). 
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protect individual rights of conscience against religious orthodoxies, or 
instead were designed to protect the secular state against a potentially 
dangerous rival bolstered by claims of divine authority. As one scholar 
described it, traditionally “[m]ortmain is the composite legislative response 
to attacks upon the viability of the state from within from institutions that 
would compete with the lawful government for control.”133 By the early 
decades of the nineteenth century in America, however, both liberal 
Protestants in the North and conservative Southerners (except in cases 
involving slavery) generally privileged the individualized interpretation. 
They elevated personal belief and conscientious scruple above organized 
religion. In so doing, they limited the power of religious leaders and the 
organizations they led, to allow free entrance and exit for members, and to 
protect individuals against new incarnations of religious authority.134  
State statutes also provided for lay management of religious corpora-
tions as part of the system of disestablishment. Acting like a disestablished 
state meant mandating the protection of individual citizens—giving them 
the power not only to choose a religion, but also to control it. In a study of 
how corporations became a means of organizing communities and enterpris-
es, one scholar noted that the imposition of democratic rule on corporations 
through legislative mandates reflected republican ideals: “The corpora-
tion . . . became, and remains, a child of the American Revolution and a 
testament to its enduring impact, for good and for ill, on the political and 
social structure . . . of the United States.”135 In the story of the gradual 
embrace of the corporation, this article suggests, we should recognize that 
religious corporations were the first major private associations to incorpo-
rate. Equally important, religious corporations were key players in achieving 
the acceptance of the corporate form, bound up with the commitment to 
disestablish, on the one hand, and the protection of individual conscience, 
on the other. 
 
133 See A.H. Oosterhoff, The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review, 27 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 257, 257 (1977). 
134 See Scott v. Thompson, 21 Iowa 599 (1866) (requiring a “fraudulent” prophet to return 
property donated by followers, because he had abused their trust); Gass & Bonta v. Wilhite, 32 Ky. 
(2 Dana) 170 (1834) (upholding Shaker contract against seceding members, because they had full 
notice of terms and chose to join the religious society); CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES 
OF UTOPIA 79, 115-61 (1980) (noting that state, not divine, law controlled in antebellum America); 
Judicial Decision—On Community, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 19, 1827, at 3 (reporting 
on the 1820 New Hampshire Superior Court case, Heath v. Draper, which rejected the claim of a 
former member of the Society of Shakers, on the ground that standard law of contract, not 
evaluation of the truth of the underlying religion, governed the dispute). 
135 See Maier, supra note 31, at 84; see also HURST, supra note 43, at 11. 
  
334 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 307 
 
Trustees were the bridge between the congregation and the state. Trus-
tees, chosen democratically and ruling by majority vote, became the recog-
nized and legitimate embodiment of a religious society. In order to hold 
property securely, general incorporation statutes required religious institu-
tions to elect trustees from among their members,136 blending traditional 
charitable concepts of trust law and trusteeship with religious institutions. 
In this way as well, states adapted traditional categories to suit a new 
environment, blending older concepts to generate a roadmap for the 
ongoing management of religious corporations. Some statutes included 
rules for voting, specifying in certain cases that all white male members 
were enfranchised.137 The minimum number of trustees was often three, and 
the maximum ranged from five up to fifteen.138 Once elected, trustees were 
incorporated as a unit and took control of all church property.139 Thereafter, 
they held title to land and financial assets, and managed the affairs of the 
church.140 In Kansas, the state constitution even required that all religious 
property be held by trustees elected by the membership.141 Even those states 
 
136 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1257, at 274 (Ormond, Bagby & Goldthwaite 1852) (allowing three 
to nine trustees); Act of Dec. 7, 1837, ARK. DIGEST OF STAT. ch. 144, § 1, at 899 (Gould 1858) 
(unspecified number of trustees); Act of Apr. 22, 1850, CAL. DIGEST OF LAWS ch. 6, § 175, at 56 
(Wood 1857) (three to fifteen trustees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 206, at 133 (1866) (at least three 
trustees); DEL. REV. STAT. ch. 39, §§ 1–2, at 105 (1852) (three to twelve trustees); 1846–1847 
FLA. ACTS ch. 84, § 38, at 36 (up to ten trustees); Act of Dec. 3, 1805, GA. DIGEST OF LAWS 
899 (Cobb 1851) (unspecified number of trustees); Act of 1845, § 44, ILL. STAT. 979, 980 (Treat, 
Scates & Blackwell 1858) (up to ten trustees); Act of June 17, 1852, 1 IND. REV. STAT. ch. 101, §§ 
1, 9, at 459-60 (1852) (three to five trustees); Act of Mar. 22, 1858, § 6, IOWA REV. STAT. § 1195, 
at 202 (1860) (unspecified number of trustees); Act of Feb. 1, 1814, 1813–1814 KY. ACTS ch. 164, at 
211-12 (“not exceeding five” trustees); 1860 MD. CODE art. 26, § 88, at 165 (five to thirteen 
trustees); 1 MICH. COMP. LAWS ch. 68, § 2, at 660 (Cooley 1857) (three to nine trustees); 
MINN. PUB. STAT. ch. 17, § 15, at 279 (Sherburne & Hollinshead) (three to nine trustees); Act of 
Mar. 16, 1786, § 1, 1785–1786 N.J. ACTS ch. 129, § 1, at 255-56 (up to seven trustees); 1854 N.C. 
REV. CODE ch. 97, § 3, at 500 (Moore & Biggs 1855) (a “suitable number” of trustees); 1 OHIO 
REV. STAT. ch. 29, § 83, at 305-06 (Swan 1860) (at least three trustees); Act of Oct. 24, 1864, § 2, 
OR. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, at 633 (Deady 1866) (at least three trustees); PA. DIGEST OF LAWS 866 
(Purdon & Brightly 1862) (unspecified number of trustees); 1857–1858 TENN. CODE § 1467, at 318 
(Meigs & Cooper 1858) (three to nine trustees); TEX. DIGEST OF LAWS art. 2063, at 443 
(Oldham & White 1859) (three to nine trustees). 
137 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 6, 1784, 1784 N.Y. LAWS ch. 18, at 614. 
138 See supra note 136. 
139 See Act of Apr. 6, 1784, 1784 N.Y. LAWS ch. 18, at 614-15; Trs. of Ministerial Fund and 
School Fund in Levant v. Parks, 10 Me. 441 (1833) (holding that an action could be brought by the 
trustees of a corporation as a group). 
140 ZOLLMAN, supra note 21, at 49-53 (discussing the role of trustees empowered to control 
property); Kauper & Ellis, supra note 31, at 1509-12.  
141 KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (1859) (repealed 1974); see also KAN. GEN. LAWS ch. 44, § 38 
(1862) (requiring a minimum of three trustees). Some lay trustee control, even among Catholics, is 
still present in America. See, e.g., Krauze v. Polish Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Parish, No. 0822-
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(e.g., Virginia, West Virginia, Arkansas, Rhode Island) that did not allow 
churches to incorporate still allowed trustees to manage church property, 
generally as a matter of judge-made common law.142 Yet the key to all such 
property holding was lay control.  
One might assume that this deference to individual interests would 
prove an unwelcoming environment for the development of powerful 
religious institutions. The assumption would be mistaken, however, espe-
cially because fast-paced growth in religious communities accompanied the 
discipline of disestablishment. Popular religious leaders (as opposed to the 
old fogies) found themselves empowered by the new regime. These upstarts 
changed forever the way we think about religious life in America, invigorat-
ing religious institutions, especially new ones.143 It is a remarkable story, one 
in which a vigorous “market” in religion flourished amid sharp restrictions 
on institutional liberty.144 
II. ENTHUSIASM AND REGULATION 
The generation that came of age around the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury participated in one of the largest revivals of religion in history, known 
to posterity as the Second Great Awakening. This generation inherited a 
world in which traditional authority had been overturned. The Revolution 
and its aftermath plunged the nation into bitter controversies over religion 
and its place in the new nation, as well as the relationship between individ-
uals and God. As we have seen, disestablishment was felt at the local level 
 
CC07847, at 33 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2012), available at http://piotr.sabrestlouis.com/2012_03_15_ 
JUDGMENT_St.Stanislaus.pdf (holding in favor of the independent operation of a parish); Tim 
Townsend, St. Louis Archdiocese and St. Stanislaus Reach Settlement that Makes Church Independent, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/faith-and-values/ 
st-louis-archdiocese-and-st-stanislaus-reach-settlement-that-makes/article_c876ca45-4999-5a2b-
8b5b-03a7a48ab145.html (describing the St. Louis Archdiocese’s settlement with the local parish). 
142 See Act of Dec. 7, 1837, § 1, ARK. DIGEST OF STAT. 899, 899 (Gould 1858) (enabling 
trustees to hold and manage lands for religious societies); VA. CODE tit. 22, ch. 77, §§ 8–9, 362-63 
(1849) (enabling Circuit Court–appointed trustees to manage religious congregations’ property). 
For the laws of Rhode Island and West Virginia, see TYLER, supra note 54, at 344-49. 
143 Several of early America’s powerful national religious leaders appear in this study. See, for 
example, infra notes 157, 175 & 192, for references to, respectively, Charles Grandison Finney, 
Richard Allen, and John England, and supra notes 119-126, for Joseph Smith. There are many 
hundreds of others whose inspiration changed the lives of those around them. See generally 
WHITNEY R. CROSS, THE BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASTIC RELIGION IN WESTERN NEW YORK, 1800–1850 (Harper & 
Row 1965) (1950).  
144 For an exploration of religious markets and marketing in the early national period, see R. 
LAURENCE MOORE, SELLING GOD: AMERICAN RELIGION IN THE MARKETPLACE OF 
CULTURE 12-65 (1994). 
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far more poignantly than in, for example, Congress as it debated the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Bill of Rights.145 It also 
played out in individual lives, as Americans in the early nineteenth century 
wrestled with the ways that religious authority was reconfigured and limited 
after the demise of state-supported religion. As one outraged but now-
marginalized Connecticut minister lamented after the vote in 1818 to 
disestablish the state’s Standing Order, “It was as dark a day as ever I saw. 
The odium thrown upon the ministry was inconceivable.”146  
Legislatures’ eroding respect for churchmen reflected the prevailing po-
litical sentiment, but also had roots in religious life. The rejection of 
involuntary religious practice that underpinned disestablishment accelerated 
developments already underway in Protestant thought and among more 
free-thinking Catholics. Historians of religion disagree about the root 
causes of the changes in religious life that followed disestablishment: some 
claim the outpouring of religious fervor of the Second Great Awakening 
was a reflection of the energies unleashed by religious liberty, while others 
claim religious communities became refuges from the disaster of early 
national American political life. From one perspective, the explosion of 
popular religious enthusiasm was itself a democratization of American 
Christianity, rooted in the new freedom to express and embrace heartfelt 
piety.147 Viewed from a different angle, the same liberation of religious life 
fed into a vacuum of authority—the chaos and destructive tenor of early 
national politics, so the argument goes, backlit the civilizing benefits of 
religious community.148 Instead of embracing the democratic virtues of 
American politics, one recent work charges, religious leaders often traded in 
fear and condemnation rather than joy and liberation.149  
Whether condemned for entrenching the “blinding mistrust of secular 
politics”150 or celebrated as embracing the “aspirations of society’s outsid-
ers,”151 the Second Great Awakening was powered by disestablishment. 
 
145 See generally Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and Adoption 
of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223 (1988) (detailing the highly political history 
of the passage of the Bill of Rights). 
146 1 THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LYMAN BEECHER 252 (Barbara M. Cross ed., 1961) 
(1864). 
147 See generally NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRIS-
TIANITY (1989).  
148 See AMANDA PORTERFIELD, CONCEIVED IN DOUBT: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN 
THE NEW AMERICAN NATION 5-13 (2012). 
149 See id. at 2, 11, 106, 130 (showing that, by cultivating mistrust and fear of chaos, religious 
leaders taught Americans to value faith over reason). 
150 Id. at 11. 
151 HATCH, supra note 147, at 226. 
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Liberty from government-controlled religion upended some forms of 
traditional authority, creating space for great innovation. Yet the state did 
not bow out of the equation. Instead, it reconfigured its approach, ceding 
some organizational authority, but imposing limits on wealth and requiring 
lay control. In this light, an appreciation of the tenor of disestablishment 
brings the state back in to the narrative of religious revival.152 Paying close 
attention to how disestablishment was implemented teaches us not only 
about religion, but also about how the state (or states, as this study demon-
strates) made sense of a new politics of religion. 
From this more complete vantage point, it is clear that historical works 
that treat the Awakening either as the product of individual enthusiasm or 
as an outgrowth of political failure implicitly assume a separation of gov-
ernment from religious life that never really happened. Instead, disestab-
lishment greatly changed—but did not destroy—the relationship between 
religion and government. The new regime included substantial independ-
ence, but also significant regulation. Rather than being a “free market” in 
religion, this was an administered market, where interactions often took 
place without direct government intervention, but still within the broad 
parameters set by state laws on religious societies. The legal regime pro-
foundly affected religious communities and the resolution of disagreements 
therein. The new discipline restricted wealth and imposed lay control, 
creating new arenas for activity by many groups, but also setting limits that 
generated new stresses.  
A. A Regulated Market for Faith 
As disestablishment took root, denominations competed for members. 
Mobility in the population and among preachers made for great excitement, 
especially when a revivalist came to town or camp meetings drew worship-
pers from afar. As the capacity to choose among denominations or ministers 
settled in to common experience, the focus on individual moral capacity 
grew commensurately. Debate grew hot over the moral responsibility of 
individuals and their ability to experience God’s grace directly. Fervent 
abolitionism was one aspect of such debates, but others also erupted after 
believers had been freed from the restraints imposed by established 
 
152 See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL 
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 525-40 (1992) (arguing that protective 
social legislation in the late nineteenth century establishes the value of “bringing the state back in” 
as a subject of historical inquiry). 
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religion.153 In cultural and spiritual terms, the one-size-fits-all approach to 
disestablishment produced a (very) rough equality of opportunity among 
religious actors. With no official machinery dedicated to advancing or 
hindering individual faith and practice, the growth in new voices, new 
methods, new doctrines, and, especially, popular appeals to individual 
conscience, all meant stunning change. 
Parishioners felt new power to vote not only with their feet, but also 
with lawsuits. When they left, fired a minister, or split into factions, the 
resulting legal battles echoed the waves of conversions that characterized the 
Awakening. What the contestants may not have recognized at the time, but 
is evident in retrospect, is that disestablishment created space for growth, 
but also set limits on how much wealth and power a religious organization 
could acquire. General incorporation statutes imposed boundaries on real 
and personal property, while lay control of church corporations undercut the 
power of the clergy. Together, these new rules sculpted both the fabulous 
growth in popular religious life and the way that disputes were conceived 
and resolved. In what follows, I focus on just the most prominent examples 
of the relationship between religious enthusiasm and disestablishment.154  
Religious developments also focused on lay empowerment. Baptist and 
Methodist preachers, many of them appealing to common people in simple 
language, reaped a rich harvest in the South and West in the early nine-
teenth century. Across the North, evangelicals, Unitarians, transcendental-
ists, and liberal Protestants elevated individual religious experience. Upstate 
New York was so afire with successive waves of popular religious enthusiasm 
that it became known as the “burned-over” district.155  
Evangelical preacher and recovering lawyer Charles Grandison Finney, 
for one, claimed that individual Christians were capable of achieving their 
own salvation without the aid of clerics. In theological terms, they were 
charged with the individual duty to experience holiness, rather than a 
collective mandate to obey doctrine. 156  Personally, when faced with a 
difficult question, Finney “spread the subject before God, and soon made up 
 
153 On the early national and antebellum eras as blending spiritual with political focus on 
individual perfectibility and abolitionism, see generally ROBERT H. ABZUG, COSMOS CRUM-
BLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION (1994); RICHARD J. 
CARWARDINE, EVANGELICALS AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 199-234 (1993).  
154 The field is ripe for additional research, which will provide vital insights into the relation-
ship of law and religion in this formative era of American law. 
155 See generally CROSS, supra note 143; HATCH, supra note 147, at 162-89; PORTERFIELD, 
supra note 148, at 78-112. 
156 ROBERT H. ABZUG, PASSIONATE LIBERATOR: THEODORE DWIGHT WELD AND 
THE DILEMMA OF REFORM 245-58 (1980).  
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[his] mind what to do.”157 He threw out the collected wisdom of the fathers, 
in other words, in favor of his own inspiration. Like the Presbyterian 
Finney, most Baptists and many Methodists also trusted individual con-
science over the collected wisdom of elders, be they religious or political.158 
As one scholar put it, “humans [now] had a direct channel to God, unmedi-
ated by civil or ecclesiastical authorities.”159  
To this generation, intellect seemed a poor substitute for intuition; gen-
uine and unscripted experience occurred outside the purview of scholars. 
Access to the spirit was the key, rather than immersion in theological 
debates or learned discourse. Enthusiastic preaching, dreams, visions, and 
long-suppressed folk beliefs and practices all sustained the conversions of 
everyday folk, no matter how rough their education: “[L]arnin’ [sic] isn’t 
religion, and eddication [sic] don’t give a man the power of the Spirit,” 
declared one anonymous evangelist. 160  The phenomenally successful 
Methodist itinerant Lorenzo Dow exemplified the popular spirit; he 
preached anywhere and everywhere—shaking, crying, pleading—in ragged 
clothing and with wild gesticulations and frequent convulsions.161 
Thanks to general incorporation statutes in many states, religious com-
munities did not need sophistication or political influence to acquire legal 
protection. All they needed was a simple form, and generally a small sum to 
defray filing costs, in order to achieve legal recognition as an incorporated 
society. The power of the corporate form allowed untutored leaders such as 
Lorenzo Dow (or Joseph Smith, for that matter) to organize existing 
believers and new converts, and to win the same level of legal recognition 
that went to more established religious bodies. The simplicity of the system 
appealed to ordinary folk because of the ease with which the statutory 
provisions could be satisfied. The efflorescence of such organizations 
 
157 See CHARLES E. HAMBRICK-STOWE, CHARLES G. FINNEY AND THE SPIRIT OF 
AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM 92-93 (1996) (noting that, for Finney, individual capacity meant 
salvation was a moral and spiritual choice); see also CHARLES G. FINNEY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
304 (Fleming H. Revell Co. 1908) (1876); Elizabeth B. Clark, Anticlericalism and Antistatism 
4-5 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
158 See ABZUG, supra note 156 at 127-62; WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, REVIVALS, AWAK-
ENINGS AND REFORM: AN ESSAY ON RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1607–
1977, at 98-140 (1978). 
159 Clark, supra note 157, at 7. 
160 1 SAMUEL G. GOODRICH, RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFETIME 196 (N.Y., Miller, Orton 
& Co. 1856). 
161 LORENZO DOW, HISTORY OF COSMOPOLITE; OR JOURNAL OF LORENZO DOW 
176, 202 (Pittsburgh, Israel Rees 1849). 
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testifies both to the effectiveness of the new preaching and the appeal of the 
roughly level playing field achieved by incorporation.162  
The power to choose, therefore, was expressed in both religious doc-
trines and corporate organization. Each affected the other, bringing the new 
corporations into immediate engagement with the aspirations of congre-
gants. Religious doctrine and congregants’ own convictions were united in 
the new organizations; or, if a group disagreed about what its goals and 
commitments truly were, then the power to leave and create a new corpora-
tion came quickly into play, bringing with it a destructive potential. 
Churches, like the new country, found themselves pulled apart by the great 
religious and political questions of the age.163 
The power of the common people to decide their own religious alle-
giances implied that slavery—to name the most hotly and frequently 
debated question—was a violation of God’s law of freedom of conscience. 
“[P]rofessed piety toward God is . . . base and spurious,” proclaimed one 
abolitionist minister in 1832, “[if] not united with benevolence for men.”164 
At the same time, the presence of enslaved persons in the pews highlighted 
and challenged the antiauthoritarian assumptions of lay empowerment.  
The contrast between what disestablishment accomplished and what it 
left untouched was stark: legal constraints on the body to coerce belief were 
eliminated, yet coercion of the body in slavery survived and eventually 
deepened and spread. The disparity was a matter of deep religious im-
port.165 As one dedicated abolitionist put it in language drawn directly from 
political life, a true church in America had to embrace freedom for all: “[A] 
church ought to be an anti slavery Society (for certainly [the bible] is both an 
Anti Slavery Constitution and Declaration of Sentiments) . . . .”166 
 
162 CROSS, supra note 143, at 3-4; Sidney E. Mead, American Protestantism During the Revolu-
tionary Epoch, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS 166-67 ( John M. 
Mulder & John F. Wilson eds., 1978). 
163 See infra text accompanying notes 191-241.  
164 BERIAH GREEN, FOUR SERMONS, PREACHED IN THE CHAPEL OF THE WESTERN 
RESERVE COLLEGE 41 (Cleveland, Office of the Herald 1833) (emphasis omitted). 
165 Some observers have made similar points. See, e.g., Rhys Isaac, “The Rage of Malice of the 
Old Serpent Devil”: The Dissenters and the Making and Remaking of the Virginia Statute for Religious 
Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND 
CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 139, 163 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan 
eds., 1988). 
166 Letter from J.A. Thome to Theodore Dwight Weld (Feb. 7, 1839), in 2 LETTERS OF 
THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, ANGELINA GRIMKÉ WELD AND SARAH GRIMKÉ, 1822–1844, 
at 750, 751 (Gilbert H. Barnes & Dwight L. Dumond eds., De Capo Press 1970) (1934). See 
generally GEORGE BOURNE, THE BOOK AND SLAVERY IRRECONCILABLE (Phila., J.M. 
Sanderson & Co. 1816); David Brion Davis, The Emergence of Immediatism in British and American 
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With escalating virulence, slaveholders fought back against such eman-
cipatory religious theories and their proponents; by the second quarter of 
the nineteenth century, slave revolts had been kindled in the pews of new 
evangelical movements, which were then brutally suppressed in reprisal.167 
Across the South, especially in Virginia, lay control had been common even 
before disestablishment. After the Revolution, the slaveholding laity 
recreated religious authority by encouraging “voluntary” submission to divine 
governance. Virginia slaveholders, that is, deployed their reconstituted power 
within a disestablished church to ensure that older patterns of dominance 
were reinscribed and updated. In this way, slaveholders and their supporters 
ostensibly catered to the egalitarian aura of disestablishment, while also 
providing a familiar protective privilege for slaveholding.168  
Yet the direct connection between God and the individual had other 
more genuinely equalizing, even antiauthoritarian, effects. The religious 
experience of farmers or laborers—as opposed to the abstractions of elite 
clerics—gained credence in disestablishment. The common people, ex-
plained one radical evangelist, had followed Jesus even as “the monarchical, 
aristocratical and priestly authorities cried ‘crucify him!’”169 When individual 
spirituality acquired pride of place, traditional clerical authority, much like 
traditional modes of funding for religious institutions, became vulnerable to 
a more popular model. The emerging relationship between disestablishment 
and individual religious experience generated support for lay stewardship of 
religious organizations, especially because ordinary people could be trusted 
to recognize the divine in their lives. 
This focus on individual capacity to discern God’s will also played out in 
attacks on civil commands. The potential for anarchy was evident even 
among highly educated young men such as Ralph Waldo Emerson. As 
Emerson’s compatriot Bronson Alcott said,  
 
Antislavery Thought, 49 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 209 (1962); Anne C. Loveland, Evangelicalism 
and “Immediate Emancipation” in American Antislavery Thought, 32 J.S. HIST. 172 (1966). 
167 See, e.g., DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, HE SHALL GO OUT FREE: THE LIVES OF DEN-
MARK VESEY 154-74 (Rowman & Littlefield rev. ed. 2004) (1999) (discussing the response to 
Denmark Vesey’s planned slave rebellion in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1822). For a detailed 
account of the Vesey rebellion, see Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Denmark Vesey, 7 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 728 (1861), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/issues/1861jun/higgin.htm. 
White authorities destroyed the African Methodist Episcopal Church there when they discovered 
the plot, convinced that the church had been at the center of the rebellion.  
168 See BUCKLEY, supra note 48, at 7-54, 141-43; PORTERFIELD, supra note 148, at 172-75. 
169 BENJAMIN AUSTIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM, IN OPPOSITION TO FAL-
LACIOUS FEDERALISM 213-14 (Bos., Adams & Rhoades 1803). 
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Church and State are responsible to me; not I to them. They cease to deserve 
our veneration from the moment they violate our consciences. . . . Why 
would I employ a church to write my creed or a state to govern me? Why 
not write my own creed? Why not govern myself?170 
Contests between anarchy and government in religion (as well as politics) 
found expression in both legal disputes and judicial resolution of such 
conflicts. Often, courts privileged individual conscience by upholding the 
actions of lay trustees, even against long-established religious traditions. 
B. Going to Law 
Creating a legal framework for religious institutions meant that law in 
turn became fundamental to the understanding of what it meant to be a 
religious institution. This shift occurred in litigation as well as through 
legislation. Litigation over new methods and unorthodox beliefs wracked 
churches across the new nation. Lay control of church property meant that 
disagreements over individual conscience often migrated into courtrooms, 
where judges faced bitter fights between congregations and their ministers, 
fights between two (or more) factions in a congregation, or even challenges 
from one or more congregations to a bishop or general conference. In 
courtrooms, the regulations imposed by state legislatures were interpreted 
and applied, deepening the relationship between the system of disestab-
lishment and the course of religious life. Religious societies had been 
explicitly recognized and limited by positive state laws: determining the 
contours of these laws drew litigants to the state venue for finding such 
meaning—that is, to the courts.  
Ironically, then, popular religious enthusiasm and official disestablish-
ment drew courts and legislatures more rather than less deeply into reli-
gious life. Often, members or former members asked courts to endorse 
doctrinal changes and increased power for individuals against opposition, or 
they opposed such change against new heresies. The amount of litigation is 
staggering. At every turn, quarrels devolved into arguments over church 
polity, the rights of congregants, the disposition of church property, and the 
 
170 Richard O. Curry & Lawrence B. Goodheart, Individualism in Trans-National Context, in 
AMERICAN CHAMELEON: INDIVIDUALISM IN TRANS-NATIONAL CONTEXT 1, 8 (Richard O. 
Curry & Lawrence B. Goodheart eds., 1991) (citing Lewis Perry, Versions of Anarchism in the 
Antislavery Movement, 20 AM. Q. 768, 771 (1968)). 
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standing of ministers.171 State reports of cases are littered with such dis-
putes,172 but none were as all-consuming as battles over slavery. 
There were rough differences in legal strategy and outcome by region 
and denomination, as well as many similarities. Abolitionists from New 
England, New York, and Pennsylvania challenged religious orthodoxy in 
part because they were so convinced that slavery violated essential Christian 
mandates. By the 1830s, they were disillusioned by religious organizations’ 
silence on the question. Many advocated nonsectarian “come-outerism,” and 
by the tens of thousands left traditional denominations in the interest of 
“Christian fellowship” over “[corrupt] church connection[s].”173 Even those 
who remained behind felt the pull of conscience so deeply that cracks began 
to appear in many Protestant denominations over the issue of slavery, 
widening within a decade into wrenching schisms.174  
Such movements deepened the fission within religious groups, which 
were already riven by the empowerment of the laity. By the late 1790s, 
Richard Allen in Philadelphia and other African American religious leaders 
from Baltimore, New York, and New Jersey reacted to increasing racism by 
withdrawing from interracial churches and starting down the path that led 
in 1816 to founding their own denomination, the African Methodist Episco-
pal Church (AME). A long and bitter legal controversy over church property 
finally vindicated the claims of the AME Church and its members to the 
property of Bethel Church and the right to choose their own preachers.175  
 
171 See generally BUCKLEY, supra note 48, at 116-43.  
172 See, for example, the series of cases that surrounded the formation and early years of 
separate “African” churches, such as the churches known as Mother Bethel and St. Thomas’s 
African Episcopal Church. Commonwealth v. Cain, 5 Serg. & Rawle 510 (Pa. 1820) (holding 
trustees could alter articles of incorporation to exclude those in arrears on pew rents from voting 
in trustee elections); Green v. African Methodist Episcopal Soc’y, 1 Serg. & Rawle 254 (Pa. 1815) 
(holding disaffected member could not be ejected without majority vote of trustees). 
173 WILLIAM GOODELL, COME-OUTERISM: THE DUTY OF SECESSION FROM A COR-
RUPT CHURCH 36 (N.Y., Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y 1845); RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTI-
SLAVERY APPEAL: AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM AFTER 1830, at 48-49 (1976). See generally John 
R. McKivigan, The Antislavery “Comeouter” Sects: A Neglected Dimension of the Abolitionist Movement, 
26 CIV. WAR HIST. 142 (1980). 
174  See generally CARWARDINE, supra note 153, at 199-234; C.C. GOEN, BROKEN 
CHURCHES, BROKEN NATION: DENOMINATIONAL SCHISMS AND THE COMING OF THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1985).  
175 For additional information on this controversy, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, The African 
Supplement: Religion, Race, and Corporate Law in Early National America (2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). See also generally CAROL V.R. GEORGE, SEGREGATED 
SABBATHS: RICHARD ALLEN AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT BLACK CHURCHES, 
1760–1840 (1973); GARY B. NASH, FORGING FREEDOM: THE FORMATION OF PHILADELPH-
IA’S BLACK COMMUNITY, 1720–1840, at 227-33 (1988); RICHARD S. NEWMAN, FREEDOM’S 
PROPHET: BISHOP RICHARD ALLEN, THE AME CHURCH, AND THE BLACK FOUNDING 
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The Methodist Episcopal Church was itself a new denomination in the 
late eighteenth century, founded only in 1784 as the former Church of 
England devolved into a more conservative and restrained Episcopal 
Church.176 The Methodists were a tiny new group, followers of John Wes-
ley’s “methodistical” (and far more raucous and expressive) approach to 
worship. 177  Lay exhorters and itinerant preachers—few of whom were 
formally educated in the faith—led meetings and love feasts that yielded a 
rich harvest of converts, especially along the fringes of society. Methodism’s 
adherents numbered a negligible 1000 in 1776, but swelled to 250,000 by 1820 
and 500,000 by 1830.178 Hidden in these phenomenal increases, however, lay 
conflict—especially over race and slavery. Because such conflict took place 
within and between corporations, resolution generally turned on the powers 
of trustees, the scope of religious authority, and, of course, the control of 
church property.  
C. The Trouble with Conscience 
Schism, the bane of organization, became a constant in American reli-
gious life within a generation of disestablishment. With incorporation 
statutes, states had created a template for organization, but they did not 
provide for continuity. To do so would have meant privileging authority in a 
more traditional sense, denying the power of congregants to change and to 
reflect that change in institutional structures. And change they did: espe-
cially on issues of race and slavery, religious societies became sites of fierce 
and divisive conflict. The danger of lay empowerment was revealed in the 
brittleness of religious societies. Fracture became a byproduct of the legal 
structures imposed on religious corporations, combined with the great 
tension that flowed from vibrant religious practice among diverse and 
divergent American communities, on the one hand, and slavery, on the 
other.  
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The power of religious conviction led American believers in diametrically 
opposed directions over slavery and the religious status of enslaved persons, 
drawing state and local governments, and eventually the national govern-
ment, into the fractures that followed. Like the divisions already discussed 
in cases arising in Philadelphia, race and individualism played a commensu-
rately vital role in southern masters’ eventual embrace of evangelical 
Christianity. The story has everything to do with slavery, reflecting the 
uneasy and changeable nature of religious organizations and their intimate 
connection to coercion in the antebellum South. 
As with disestablishment, the churching of southern white men played 
out over time. At the turn of the nineteenth century, slaveholders across the 
South were fiercely independent in their religious opinions. As one scholar 
put it, “[A]ll Baptists and Methodists whose ministries straddled the turn of 
the century came to realize[ that] the South’s masters knew how to resist 
being thus mastered” by preachers.179 Itinerant ministers—especially if their 
services incorporated the testimonies of enslaved persons and white wom-
en—were often treated violently. Methodist camp meetings proved particu-
larly tempting targets for bands of rowdy skeptics,180 because their preachers 
seemed to lack manly control over their congregants. 
By the 1820s, however, white Methodist and Baptist ministers in the 
South had reworked their antislavery image and their interracial preaching 
and worship services.181 They began to downplay the role of African Ameri-
cans in church services by restricting the texts on which they could preach 
and the places where they could speak.182 White Methodist memoirists even 
downplayed the power and significance of black preachers by dismissing 
them as “good old uncles.”183  
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Despite the efforts of white Southerners, however, the South saw a spec-
tacular rise of black preachers and spiritual exhorters, especially among 
Baptists and Methodists. These new preachers reflected the promise of 
freedom of conscience. At the same time, they tested the commitment of 
popular denominations to a unified vision of human moral potential. In 
Charleston, South Carolina, for example, a separate African Church was 
created when white Methodists tried to abolish a blacks-only quarterly 
conference and announced a plan to construct a new building on the black 
Methodist graveyard.184 Other African American Methodist and Baptist 
organizations emerged in Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
Georgia.185 There were likely others whose legacy has not survived. The 
Charleston African Church was destroyed in 1822 when white residents 
discovered that its members included the antislavery rebel Denmark Vesey, 
a former slave who preached that the Bible said slavery was wrong, and 
many of his followers. 186  Thereafter, such religious independence was 
strictly prohibited (and punished). 187  In several jurisdictions, organized 
worship among slaves without white supervision was made illegal under 
state law. 188  Nevertheless, the spread of Christian exhortation among 
enslaved persons carried the same message of liberty of belief and moral 
capacity that so galvanized the revolution against religious authority among 
ordinary folk everywhere in antebellum America. 
After the Vesey rebellion, religious services among white Southerners no 
longer challenged the racial code of slavery, and white ministers consistently 
catered to the world of masters. Preachers developed a theory of spiritual 
warfare that cast them as martial leaders, and white church members as “the 
army of Jesus.”189 Spiritual and military weapons thus blended together in 
preachers’ appeals to white men. Later, young male congregants were 
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enlisted to “guard” camp meetings, enforcing strict decorum. In this newly 
militarized religious culture, white men were told they had become warriors 
for Jesus, “yielding victories that equaled if not exceeded the triumphs of 
their fathers” on battlefields that featured sinners rather than the soldiers of 
the British king and his allies.190  
Baptist and Methodist ministers thus adopted and adapted the culture of 
racial mastery that sustained slavery in the antebellum South. By embracing 
the sensibilities of masters, southern white evangelical preachers catered to 
the southern masters’ individual authority and spiritual capacity. As in the 
North, religious authority shifted from the pulpit to the pew, but in the 
South the shift deferred to slaveholders—reinforcing rather than challeng-
ing their authority to coerce. The embrace of slavery brought many converts 
to white Protestant churches by 1830. The shift to lay empowerment in a 
slave culture laid the groundwork for later confrontations over the spiritual 
status of slavery by region. But in the meantime, confrontations over the 
powers of laypersons traveled far and wide. 
III. THE CONTAGION OF LAY EMPOWERMENT 
One might assume that the wrestling over local lay control was a 
Protestants-only tourney. Scholars sometimes refer to the “de facto” estab-
lishment of Protestantism after formal disestablishment.191 Yet the system of 
disestablishment imposed by states affected all religious communities, often 
disrupting patterns of governance and expressions of faith. Such reconstruc-
tion of traditional patterns was often welcomed by congregants but resisted 
by clergy and religious hierarchies.  
Catholics were a crucial part of this story, especially in the antebellum 
period. Their history also featured a revolt against authority, fought bitterly 
around the country. Thanks to the tools provided to them by state legisla-
tion, individual Catholics were armed with new means of conceiving their 
place in the faith. The attack on Catholic clerical authority thus came from 
within, buoyed by the contagion of lay empowerment that was so central to 
the first system of disestablishment. Prominent members of the Catholic 
laity, as well as a group of Americanized priests—even a bishop or two—and 
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their supporters among the Protestants all challenged the Catholic hierar-
chy, using the powers entrusted to lay trustees.192  
Like Protestants of the same period, American Catholics built on tradi-
tions of lay control that originated even before disestablishment. The 
trustee system imposed by state incorporation statutes, also called “trustee-
ism” by its detractors (in particular, by more hierarchically minded Catholic 
bishops and the Vatican), was embraced especially by the French, Spanish, 
and German Catholics in America. Many of these immigrants recalled 
substantial localism in their churches in Europe or had ancestors who told 
them about the powers of local laities in their home countries.193 In the 
United States, however, Catholic bishops set themselves against such 
inroads, asserting their episcopal authority with new vigor. The resulting 
controversies lasted from the turn of the nineteenth century through the 
1850s and beyond. The conflict affected large portions of the laity, and 
dogged bishops who struggled to stem the tide of schism. The bitterness of 
these internal battles was expressed in newspaper and pamphlet wars, 
fisticuffs, riots, the burning of one bishop in effigy, and, frequently, in 
litigation.194 
Backed by state laws, lay trustees asserted widespread control over 
Catholic congregational life and church property by the second decade of 
the nineteenth century. The contagion spread rapidly. As one shocked 
Catholic scholar wrote in the early twentieth century, lay trustees a century 
earlier had acquired “gradually the fatal tendency of regarding their priests 
as ‘servants to perform religious services,’” and even “dismiss[ed] any priest 
who attacked the system [of lay control] and . . . select[ed] clergymen who 
were amenable to dictation from themselves.”195 Such attacks on episcopal 
power were not unique to Catholicism. Methodists underwent a reformation 
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in 1824, when laypersons sought equal access to central governing struc-
tures. The resulting schism moved the main church to explain that its 
bishops did not rule the church, but were benign and noninterfering 
“superintendents.” 196  Among Episcopalians, the role of the bishop was 
explained as exactly like that of parish-level priests, only with the added 
power of ordination and representation of local interests in synods.197 
While the Catholic Church was not the only denomination to experience 
rebellion from within the ranks, it felt the challenge most deeply. The 
assertion of American Catholic lay control in the early nineteenth century 
threatened ancient and powerful lines of religious authority in Rome that 
had barely noticed the American Revolution, but that nevertheless soon felt 
its effects. 
A. Trusteeism 
The challenge to the hierarchy of the Catholic Church by its American 
laity extended from New York to New Orleans—a “dreary struggle,” as one 
Catholic priest later lamented, which “showed the legal helplessness” of a 
bishop when confronted by a determined body of trustees backed by law.198 
In the hands of lay Catholics, “trusteeism” disturbed the rule of an increas-
ingly embattled coterie of American bishops.199 
Warring factions erupted into open conflict in New York City in 1817 
when the trustees of St. Peter’s and St. Patrick’s, the two Catholic churches 
in the city at the time, divided over whether to fund the debt incurred in 
building St. Patrick’s.200 After Bishop John Connolly installed his supporter, 
the Dominican Father Charles Ffrench, as a priest at St. Peter’s, his oppo-
nents campaigned openly to defy the bishop. They claimed Ffrench was 
guilty of “serious charges of unclerical conduct,”201 including alleged carnal 
relations with a woman, licentiousness, and profligacy during an earlier 
assignment in Canada.202 He had reportedly been suspended by his superiors 
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for these very sins.203 And in New York in 1819, said his detractors, Ffrench 
assembled a mob of fellow Irishmen and invaded the trustees’ meeting, 
roughing up and forcibly ejecting the Spanish Consul, a leader of the 
trustees.204 Ffrench sued one of the New York trustees for defamation. The 
trustee defended himself by airing in open court the scandal of Ffrench’s 
Canadian escapades and his American thuggery, to the delight of the local 
press.205 Ffrench’s suit eventually was dismissed on the ground that the role 
of a church trustee included the responsibility to investigate the pastor’s 
conduct and character.206 The court thus upheld the right of trustees to pry 
into their priests’ private lives and pasts. “[H]onest Catholics,” reported one 
ally of the trustees, now “refuse[] to hear [Ffrench’s] Mass and receive 
Sacraments from his ugly hands.”207 
In other cities, explosive conflicts between the princes of the church and 
elected trustees with republican ideas convinced Rome that matters in 
America had descended into unseemly “discord and dissensions.”208 A Papal 
Bull was issued in 1822 to quell the lay rebellion in America,209 but it failed 
dismally—especially in Philadelphia. In that city, the trustees of the “miser-
ably distracted”210 St. Mary’s Church on Fourth Street attempted to oust 
the bishop’s man, one Father Cummiskey, and install the Reverend Willam 
Hogan in his stead.211 In response, the bishop of Philadelphia excommuni-
cated Hogan, a move that was upheld on appeal to Rome.212 
The entire battle was brought to court, where secular judges were em-
powered under Pennsylvania law to decide vital questions of church polity.213 
Equally sensational, Hogan—and, by implication, Catholic clergy more 
generally—was accused of making sexual advances and then beating and 
stabbing a congregant when she was hired to help him with housework and 
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errands. He was eventually acquitted of the charges, but not before a long 
trial and extensive (often contradictory) testimony revealed the fissure 
within the Catholic community.214 
In these ways, trusteeism created a challenge to Rome that was distinctly 
American, but also fed into other early nineteenth-century conflicts that 
troubled the Vatican. The prospect of trustee control over American churches 
compelled Rome to label trusteeism a heresy, a category reserved for the 
most dangerous violations and a justification, for example, for the Inquisitio 
Haereticae Pravitatis—the Inquisition. Trusteeism remains the only heresy 
ever to emerge from the United States; the ripples of the controversy it 
caused within Catholicism are still felt by American Catholics today.215  
In Pennsylvania, the Church won a Pyrrhic victory. Amendments to the 
St. Mary’s articles of incorporation drafted by the trustees to cement their 
power over the church and its ministers were eventually rejected by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.216 The defeat was a close call. In the end, the 
court held that trustees held power over all temporal assets of local Catholic 
churches, but that appointment of priests by bishops was a signal feature of 
ecclesiastical structure.217 The writ of disestablishment did not invade this 
final refuge of church polity.  
The raw fact of the power of clerical appointment, the court stressed, 
was of necessity exercised in sharply reduced circumstances. Chief Justice 
William Tilghman noted that trustees in other denominations had attempted 
similar coups.218 The Presbyterians in particular were mired in controversy 
over the right of lay vestries to dismiss controversial clerics.219 As in those 
cases, the court held in the St. Mary’s case that preexisting church govern-
ance stipulated that only bishops had the power to remove local priests.220 
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But Tilghman’s opinion also stressed that the church itself had no power 
beyond this. In light of the limits on internal control imposed by the state 
through the lay trustee system, Tilghman noted that the church’s power to 
name a priest meant precious little without the power of the purse, which 
had been transferred to lay trustees. The bishop might have the power to 
appoint a priest, but he would not be paid without trustee approval, making 
the power of appointment more symbolic than actual. In light of this partial 
authority, the court advised the bishop to tread carefully:  
It is scarcely possible that the Roman Catholics of the United States of 
America, should not imbibe some of that spirit of religious freedom which 
is diffused throughout the country. If those who govern that 
church . . . consult the reasonable desires of the laity both in the ap-
pointment, and the removal of pastors, they may long retain their domin-
ion. . . . But if things are carried with a high hand . . . , it is easy to 
foresee how the matter will end. That church possesses neither property nor 
temporal power in this country. The laity have both.221  
Indeed, the trouble with the laity in Philadelphia and elsewhere was too 
tempestuous and wide-ranging to resolve with a single line of court deci-
sions or even a Papal Bull, however emphatic. The election of trustees held 
only months later sparked a riot in the St. Mary’s churchyard, in which 
clubs, bricks, and even repurposed iron railings left hundreds wounded.222 
The Pennsylvania legislature responded to the state supreme court by 
passing a bill that would allow precisely the amendment maneuver that the 
court had struck down. The governor, acting on the advice of the attorney 
general, vetoed the bill, but even then the Reverend Hogan held forth at St. 
Mary’s. The local bishop finally surrendered in 1826 and abandoned his 
attempt to oust Hogan, but the bishop’s retreat was vetoed by Rome in 1827 
and the standoff continued for the rest of the decade.223 As one outraged 
traditionalist described Hogan and his trustees, “This may be republicanism, 
but it is not catholicism.”224 
Similar battles in Charleston, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Rochester, 
Detroit, Baltimore, and Norfolk, Virginia, illustrate how widespread the 
pattern was.225 In New Orleans, the city was consumed by decades of 
 
221 Id. at 539-40. 
222 TOURSCHER, supra note 212, at 83-84; Schaaf, supra note 214, at ix-x. 
223 See generally TOURSCHER, supra note 212, at 162-70. 
224 DALE B. LIGHT, ROME AND THE NEW REPUBLIC: CONFLICT AND COMMUNITY 
IN PHILADELPHIA CATHOLICISM BETWEEN THE REVOLUTION AND THE CIVIL WAR 140 
(1996) (citation omitted). 
225 CAREY, supra note 193, at 107-32. 
  
2014] The First Disestablishment 353 
 
raucous conflict that pitted Creole leaders and their allies against a harried 
and miserable French native, Bishop Blanc. The local laity were accustomed 
to substantial local control, especially under Spanish and then, briefly, 
French imperial governments. After Louisiana joined the United States in 
1803, Catholics in New Orleans successfully defended their beloved pastor, 
Père Antoine, against the Church hierarchy, despite the fact that he lived 
openly with a mulatto concubine, criticized slavery, supported Freemasonry 
and the French Revolution, and publicly defied the Pope and episcopacy.226 
In 1844, the decades-long conflict between Catholic prelates reached the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, which produced a result much like the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court’s twenty years earlier. The Louisiana court held that 
trustees retained the right to refuse to pay the salary of a priest appointed 
by the bishop, even if they did not have the power to choose their own 
priest over the bishop’s objection.227 A related attack on the power of the 
trustees under state law failed in the U.S. Supreme Court when the Justices 
unanimously held that state and local laws were not subject to review under 
the religion clauses of the U.S. Constitution.228 Thus survived a New 
Orleans ordinance mandating that all Catholic funerals be held at a chapel 
controlled by the trustees—guaranteeing that the lucrative funeral trade 
would remain under lay control.229 
For their part, Catholic bishops had attempted to reassert their power 
after the first American provincial council in 1829.230 Meeting in Baltimore, 
exhausted and exasperated bishops legislated against lay organizations 
holding title to church property and reaffirmed their right to select and 
remove priests. They then lobbied state legislatures to allow bishops to hold 
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title to property in their episcopal offices, as corporations sole, and were 
successful in a few states.231  
In other jurisdictions, however, bishops were greeted with skepticism. 
Instead of accommodating Catholic canon law or similar authorities in 
Protestant denominations, these states increased lay control. In 1845, for 
example, a New York chancery court upheld the decision of a majority of 
trustees to abandon the Calvinist doctrines of the Reformed Dutch Church 
and instead become an independent congregation with more liberal “Armin-
ian” leanings that empowered individuals to take control of their own 
salvation.232  
Eventually, trustees achieved significant power to appoint or remove 
clergy, even in hierarchical denominations. In 1854, the New York Court of 
Appeals construed the state’s corporation law to allow congregations to 
entirely and directly control church property. The court held that a Presby-
terian minister could be retained by a congregation even after he had been 
excommunicated by the presbytery and synod, in the interests of “the entire 
separation of the functions of the ecclesiastical and temporal judicatories.”233 
The next year, a new state statute prohibited conveyance of all real and 
personal property “for the benefit of any person and his successor or succes-
sors in any ecclesiastical office.”234 In other words, New York prohibited the 
corporation sole, a central feature of American Catholic bishops’ attempt to 
reassert control. Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania followed suit,235 and 
other states debated similar legislation.236 
The attempted recovery of episcopal authority, in other words, was met 
with a backlash of outsize proportions. One historian of Catholicism even 
blames the infamous anti-Catholic nativism of the 1840s and ’50s on the new 
American “episcopalism.” 237  The vigorous defense of Church authority 
gradually took root among postfamine Irish immigrants to America, however, 
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as they connected their faith and national allegiance to resistance against 
British tyranny.238 In this view, the blending of anti-Irish sentiment with 
more general anti-Catholicism has obscured the origins of nativism in 
support for democracy and lay control. The recovery of ecclesiastical power 
came at a steep price, if we credit the claim that anti-Catholic nativists were 
motivated to pillage and plunder in part by the bishops’ suppression of 
democratically chosen trustees.239 
The entrenched antiauthoritarianism of trusteeism and local control did 
not devolve into secularism, despite the dire predictions of orthodox 
clerics—and the hopes of late eighteenth-century rationalists.240 Instead, 
anything that came between the people and their faith—including priests, 
presbyters, synods, dioceses, doctrines, and creeds—came under attack. In 
this way, clerical and denominational power drew down, often despite 
litigation to protect orthodoxy and traditional authority. The result had 
democratic features, to be sure. But taking law into account shows us 
something subtler and less governable. A given congregation might well 
make democratic decisions, but no dissenter was bound to respect them. 
The right of exit was always present, even if it might be expensive. The 
focus on individual freedom of conscience unleashed emotion, enthusiasm, 
creativity, legal conflict, and eventually legal power. The retreat of the old 
ways was accomplished with breathtaking speed over the course of just a 
generation or two.241  
B. Conscience over Clergy 
The commitment to protect individual conscience and to connect that 
protection to disestablishment traveled as far as the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
1844, the Justices considered a case that originated in Philadelphia but 
implicated many of the questions of lay control and structural limits on 
religious authority that accompanied disestablishment in the states.242 In 
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242 See Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 197-201 (1844) (upholding Stephen 
Girard’s bequest to Philadelphia to establish a college that excluded “all ecclesiastics, missionaries, 
and ministers of any sect” from any position—“or even [from] visiting” the college—as well as “all 
instruction in the Christian religion”).  
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this case, the relationship of disestablishment to secularism was the central 
question: Did a state without an official posture of deference to religious 
authority become an opponent of religion, or was it just disestablished?243 
Here again, the question was not separation. This time, the issue was 
outright opposition to religious authority, as it was in many contemporane-
ous trusteeism cases. Hostility to religion, a central fear of conservative 
clerics such as Lyman Beecher in 1818,244 thus lurked in the interstices of 
debates over the wealth and management of religious corporations decades 
after formal disestablishment. 
The estate of Philadelphian Stephen Girard, French-born financier of 
the War of 1812 and the richest American of his day (and one of the richest 
of any day, according to recent estimates)245 raised just such thorny ques-
tions after he died in 1831. Girard’s will left almost his entire estate to 
municipal and charitable institutions in Philadelphia and New Orleans.246 
Girard had directed that a substantial portion of his estate be dedicated to 
the education of poor, white, male orphans.247 The future Girard College of 
Philadelphia was also subject to a restriction that reflected Girard’s complex 
relationship with the Catholic Church of his youth: no minister was ever 
allowed to teach on the grounds of the school.248  
Girard’s will was challenged by his French relatives.249 Given the sums 
at stake, the family retained the services of the noted orator Daniel Webster, 
whose core argument was based on the will’s insult to religion.250 Webster, 
who twenty-five years earlier had argued against religious authority over 
education in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,251 now sought refuge 
in piety. When the Girard lawsuit came to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1843, 
Webster proclaimed, “[T]here can be no charity where the authority of God 
is derided and his word rejected.”252 Webster’s change in focus reflected his 
 
243 See id. at 198. 
244 See 1 BEECHER, supra note 146, at 252. 
245 MICHAEL KLEPPER & ROBERT GUNTHER, THE WEALTHY 100: FROM BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN TO BILL GATES—A RANKING OF THE RICHEST AMERICANS, PAST AND 
PRESENT xi (1996) (ranking Stephen Girard as the fourth wealthiest American, relative to the 
U.S. Gross National Product at the time of his death). 
246 See Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 183-86. 
247 Id. at 129. 
248 Id. at 133. 
249 Id. at 186. 
250 See id. at 175 (“The reasons which the testator gives [in support of the conditions on his 
bequest] are objectionable and derogatory to Christianity . . . .”).  
251 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). For Webster’s role in the Dartmouth College case, see Gor-
don, supra note 14. 
252 Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 174. Webster’s argument is also discussed at length in 2 
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 398-407 (1922). 
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sense of prevailing political forces as well as the interests of his clients. He 
was at that time a candidate for President, and his oral argument was attended 
by a large crowd.253 
The Girard case, therefore, though orthogonal to the statutes imposing 
property restrictions and lay empowerment, raised the implied (and inevi-
table) question of hostility to religion in a disestablished polity. Justice 
Joseph Story decided against Girard’s French relatives and Webster, but not 
because the law would tolerate anything that smacked of hostility to reli-
gion. Instead, Story was persuaded by the arguments of Horace Binney, 
who appeared for the City of Philadelphia. Binney maintained that orphans 
at Girard College should be trusted to follow their own consciences.254 
Story agreed; he held that there was nothing truly anti-Christian about the 
will’s prohibition of ministers teaching at the school. The exclusion of 
clerics, Story reasoned, did not entail the exclusion of Christianity: “What 
is there to prevent a work, not sectarian, upon the general evidences of 
Christianity, from being read and taught in the college by lay-teachers?”255 
The will did require that students be instructed in morality.256 As Story 
interpreted this instruction, all morality was grounded in the Bible, and 
because the authority of clerics was not necessary for a Christian to study 
the Bible and come to God, the will was not an anti-Christian document.257 
Leading legal minds of the day admired Story’s analysis.258 The French 
relatives lost the fortune and Girard College opened in 1848.259  
 
After attending the argument, one congressman remarked, “There is no use for ministers now. 
Daniel Webster is down in the Supreme Court room eclipsing them all by a defence of the 
Christian religion. Hereafter we are to have the gospel according to Webster.” ROBERT V. 
REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 589 (1997) (quoting Rep. John 
Wentworth of Illinois reporting the words of an unnamed congressman).  
253 Justice Joseph Story wrote to his wife on the sixth day of arguments in the case that “the 
Court-room was crowded, almost to suffocation, with ladies and gentlemen to hear [Webster]. 
Even the space behind the Judges, close home to their chairs, presented a dense mass of listeners.” 
Letter from Joseph Story to Sarah Story (Feb. 7, 1844), in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH 
STORY 467, 468 (William W. Story ed., Bos., Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851). 
254 Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 154. 
255 Id. at 200. 
256 See id. at 133 (“[A]ll the instructors and teachers in the college shall take pains to instil 
[sic] into the minds of the scholars the purest principles of morality . . . .”).  
257 Id. at 199-200. 
258 James Kent, author of a leading legal treatise of the day, Commentaries on American Law, 
wrote to Story to praise the reasoning and result of the Girard will case. Gordon, supra note 12, at 
704 & 717 n.45 (citing JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT 371 (1971)).  
259 See generally CHEESMAN ABIAH HERRICK, HISTORY OF GIRARD COLLEGE (1935); 
THOMAS U. WALTER, A DESCRIPTION OF THE GIRARD COLLEGE FOR ORPHANS (Phila., 
Girard Coll. 1848). 
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Individual religious experience was thus protected in state statutes, as 
well as in their courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court. Religion, in this new 
legal landscape, was no longer dependent on clerical authority. Yet the 
system of disestablishment imposed by states in the early nineteenth 
century was dangerous to religious community, if not hostile to all religion. 
At that time and since, the fragility of religious organizations has been a 
remarkable, if little remarked upon, feature of American religious liberty. 
IV. THE GREAT DIVIDES 
The integral relationship in America between disestablishment (the 
sundering of official ties to government) and schism (the sundering of ties 
between believers), rather than the imposition of secularism or hostility to 
religion, is the real story in American church and state before the Civil War. 
These battles were fought not just over how to define property in secular 
society, but also over how to conceive of religious property when believers 
divided. The focus on property was caused not only by limitations set by 
legislatures and then enforced in courts, but also by the fragmentation of 
religious organizations as they competed for members. Scholars of religion 
used to argue that the antebellum religious revivals created an “evangelical 
united front,” which emphasized social control and respectability.260 No 
longer. Legal disputes reveal constant warfare over limited resources, as well 
as cracks in even the most successful denominations—especially in disputes 
over individual liberty and equality. The greatest battles were those arising 
out of schisms: the fracturing of community.  
Religious groups learned that the greatest danger often came from within 
the ranks. The communion of believers, protected by incorporation but also 
subject to lay control, was at once powerful and intensely vulnerable. In 
these battles, each side fought for the right to retain church property, and 
thus be considered the “true” society in both legal and religious terms. 
Congregationalists lost property to Unitarians, Methodists to the breakaway 
African Methodist Episcopal Church and then the Methodist Episcopal 
Church South, Baptists to the Southern Baptist Convention, and so on, 
down to micro-level fractures. State law reports are full of such disputes.261 
 
260 SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 657-
59 (1972). See generally CHARLES I. FOSTER, AN ERRAND OF MERCY: THE EVANGELICAL 
UNITED FRONT, 1790–1837 (1960).  
261 In Massachusetts alone, more than eighty cases featured Unitarian majorities against 
Trinitarian Congregationalist minorities. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE 
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–
1830, at 127-28 (1975); The Exiled Churches of Massachusetts, 5 CONGREGATIONAL Q. 216, 233 
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Schism was everywhere. The Catholic hierarchy struggled to cement its 
authority among the laity by suppressing trusteeism; Protestants broke 
apart. The “moral ability” of the individual, which caused such excitement 
and innovation in religious life as well as frequent conflict between clergy 
and laity, finally became the mallet that fractured the leading Protestant 
denominations. Conflicts over slavery sundered these denominations a full 
twenty-five years before the nation followed suit. By the late 1830s, church 
life became increasingly polarized, as the sinfulness (or divine approbation) 
of slavery drew church members into debates over the Old Testament, the 
Ten Commandments, and political quietism, on the one hand, and the 
humanity of slaves and the perfectibility of American society, on the 
other.262 
The Presbyterians came asunder first, with New School synods in New 
York and Ohio (read Finney) accused of enthusiasm, revivalism, and 
liberalism by their more orthodox Old School (read Calvinist) brethren.263 
Four liberal synods were excluded from the General Assembly in 1837 and 
refused readmission the following year.264 Southern Presbyterians treated 
abolition as the redheaded stepchild of New School heresies.265 Finney and 
his ilk focused on individual investment in salvation, praying salvation up, 
rather than focusing on helpless believers who depended on the grace of an 
inscrutable God. The implications for human freedom are obvious, even if 
the debate among Presbyterians in the late 1830s turned primarily on the 
theological, rather than the humanitarian, consequences of individualism.266  
 
(1863). The “Unitarian Controversy” revealed how deeply democratic inclinations could contradict 
doctrinal orthodoxy, yet still be endorsed as consistent with establishment, thus undermining 
public support, even in the Bay State, for a divided religious polity. See LEONARD W. LEVY, 
THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 29-42 (1957) (discussing 
the role of the courts in the controversies, and their support for the more liberal Unitarians).  
262 WALTERS, supra note 173, at 47-57; see also Loveland, supra note 166, at 183. 
263 Catherine Glennan Borchert, Exscinded!: The Schism of 1837 in the Presbyterian Church 
in the United States of America and the Role of Slavery 22 n.18 (May 2009) (unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, Case Western Reserve University), available at http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view? 
acc_num=case1236819487 (click “View” or “Download”).  
264 See generally id. at 185-290 (providing a detailed account of the 1837 schism). 
265 CARWARDINE, supra note 153, at 158-59, 166-67; GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE EVAN-
GELICAL MIND AND THE NEW SCHOOL PRESBYTERIAN EXPERIENCE: A CASE STUDY OF 
THOUGHT AND THEOLOGY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 97 (Wipf & Stock 
Publishers 2003) (1970); Borchert, supra note 263, at 321-24, 328-29, 339-43. 
266 See C. Bruce Staiger, Abolitionism and the Presbyterian Schism of 1837–1838, 36 MISS. 
VALLEY HIST. REV. 391, 393 (1949) (“[T]he essential difference between the two schools lay in 
their conceptions of man’s nature. Was man by nature evil and ‘born in sin,’ or basically good and 
free of sin at birth? Was his will in bondage, and salvation a matter only for the elect, or did he 
possess a free will through which every man might win his own salvation?”).  
  
360 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 307 
 
In the resulting litigation over property between New and Old School 
Presbyterians, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice John Gibson 
imposed a democratic solution to the conflict in 1841. He held that the most 
numerous group in the state would have the right to the property—“not 
because [the majority] was more Presbyterian than the [minority], but 
because it was stronger” in numbers and thus able to claim the property in a 
democratic polity. 267  In 1845, the conservative-dominated Old School 
confirmed the suspicions of New School adherents about the unacknowl-
edged relationship between slavery and the schism. The conservatives now 
declared that slaveholding would not preclude any person from member-
ship, and that the church did not opine on political debates (although it also 
conceded that there were “evils” connected with slavery).268 Even with this 
concession to slaveholders, the Old School conservatives split again into 
southern and northern sections in 1861. 
Baptists fractured, too, in the mid-1840s, with cries from Southerners 
charging that northern abolitionists undermined the faith when they refused 
to commission a slaveholding missionary in 1844. After the formation of the 
Southern Baptist Convention in 1845 (still the largest Baptist communion), 
conflict between northern and southern branches did not subside. But the 
story of the Methodists truly marked the nadir, in part because they had so 
far to fall.269  
A. Troubled by Conscience 
The Methodist Episcopal Church had a stunning record in antebellum 
America. Its itinerant ministers ranged far and wide, evangelizing along the 
frontier and deep into rural backwaters. In camp meetings and love feasts, at 
firesides, and on street corners, the faith grew by leaps and bounds. By the 
1840s, the departure of many free blacks to their own denominations 
allowed white Southerners to worship without the embarrassment of black 
virtuosity. Methodists remained so powerful among whites across the South 
that they could still justifiably claim to be a coherent body of the church, 
 
267 Presbyterian Congregation v. Johnston, 1 Watts & Serg. 9, 38-39 (Pa. 1841); see also A 
HISTORY OF THE DIVISION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA BY A COMMITTEE OF THE SYNOD OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY 202-04 (N.Y., 
M.W. Dodd 1852). 
268 CARWARDINE, supra note 153, at 167; MARSDEN, supra note 265, at 128-41. For Presby-
terians the most painful split came with the war itself. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 
684-86 (1871); ROBERT ELLIS THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 160 (N.Y., The Christian Literature Co. 1895). 
269 WIGGER, supra note 178, at 3-7. 
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representing almost forty percent of the entire national membership.270 In 
the North, Methodists had grown even faster, but lost many members in the 
late 1830s to the “comeouter” antislavery movement. And from 1842 to 1843, 
a powerful new “abolitionized” schism drew 15,000 dedicated Methodists 
into a breakaway “Wesleyan Methodist Connection.”271 
In 1844, just as Methodists became the single largest American denomi-
nation—with well over a million members—long-simmering debates over 
the sinfulness of slavery rocked their General Conference in New York 
City.272 Alarmed by the success of the comeouter movement, New England 
delegates had threatened for almost a decade to secede unless slavery was 
openly declared a sin. Even among less radical northern conferences, 
antislavery feeling mushroomed as opposition to the expansion of slavery 
erupted in the acrid debates over the annexation of Texas, as well as theo-
logical disputes over sin and salvation.273 Northerners and Southerners each 
hardened their stances, reacting increasingly virulently against perceived 
attacks from the other side. Responding to Southerners’ uncompromising 
rejection of any middle ground, moderates who had long criticized aboli-
tionists as fanatics now found their own “abhorrence of slavery grow[ing] 
apace.”274  
Debate at the convention waxed heated and long, eventually attracting 
crowds of those curious to see a live debate over slavery, rather than just 
reading about such things in the papers.275 The central question was whether 
Bishop James Andrew of Georgia should resign because of his recent 
marriage to a slaveholding widow.276 Northerners argued that a slaveholding 
episcopacy would violate the governing antislavery doctrine of the church 
 
270 JOHN R. MCKIVIGAN, THE WAR AGAINST PROSLAVERY RELIGION: ABOLITIONISM 
AND THE NORTHERN CHURCHES, 1830–1865, at 92 (reprint 2009) (1984); see also DONALD G. 
MATHEWS, SLAVERY AND METHODISM: A CHAPTER IN AMERICAN MORALITY, 1780–1845, at 
23-29 (1965); WIGGER, supra note 178, at 3-13. 
271 McKivigan, supra note 173, at 146-47; see also LUCIUS C. MATLACK, THE LIFE OF REV. 
ORANGE SCOTT 213 (N.Y., C. Prindle & L.C. Matlack 1847) (reprinting Scott’s May 1843 speech 
defending secession at the General Convention in Utica, New York); Chris Padgett, Hearing the 
Antislavery Rank-and-File: The Wesleyan Methodist Schism of 1843, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 63, 66 n.4 
(1992) (estimating 20,000 Wesleyan Methodists by 1849). 
272 3 MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCES OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH, FOR THE YEARS 1839–1845, at 477 (N.Y., T. Mason & G. Lane n.d.) (noting that, as 
of 1844, Methodists included approximately 1 million “Whites,” 145,000 “Coloured,” and 4000 
“Indians”); JOHN NELSON NORWOOD, THE SCHISM IN THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH, 1844: A STUDY OF SLAVERY AND ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICS 177 (Porcupine Press 
1976) (1923). 
273 See MATHEWS, supra note 270, at 246-48. 
274 CARWARDINE, supra note 153, at 142 (quoting John McClintock). 
275 MATHEWS, supra note 270, at 260-61. 
276 Id. at 256-64. 
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Discipline, drafted decades earlier before the stunning growth of Method-
ism in the South, and certainly before Methodist exhorters had recrafted 
their approach to slavery or become rich enough to own slaves.277 Finally, 
after two painful weeks of talk, a vote of 110 yeas to 69 nays signaled the 
“sense” of the conference that Bishop Andrew must “‘desist from the 
exercise of his office’ so long as he remained ‘connected with slavery.’”278 All 
but one of the affirmative votes came from nonslaveholding local jurisdic-
tions, and seventy-five percent of the negative votes came from slaveholding 
counterparts.279 
Immediately, Southerners began a campaign to separate from the main 
body of the church. In response, the General Conference delegated the 
question to a committee, which drafted a “Plan of Separation” (the “Plan”) 
over three momentous days “to meet the emergency with christian kindness 
and the strictest equity.”280 The idea was to produce a mechanism for each 
side to withdraw gracefully from the now bitter and public fight.281 Gener-
ous concessions of land and money, the delegates concluded, would ensure a 
peaceful future.282 The Plan hewed a rough—and, it turned out, clumsy and 
controversial—path for conferences in the border states to determine their 
allegiances between the two Methodisms.283 The Plan also proposed the 
formation of a committee, composed of three northern and three southern 
church leaders, charged with equitably dividing the income and property of 
the “Book Concerns” based in New York and Cincinnati, including existing 
copyrights.284 This publishing house, the first American church publishing 
venture, had been founded in 1789 to print and promote Methodist ser-
mons, tracts, and memoirs. The Book Concerns became the central feature 
in protracted litigation over the schism.  
After the Plan was approved by the convention in June 1844, the “south-
ern section” moved quickly to call regional conferences for Southerners to 
 
277 Id. at 263. The Discipline, however, required ministers to emancipate slaves “only when 
practicable and where liberated persons could ‘enjoy their freedom.’” Id. at 252.  
278 Id. at 264.  
279 NORWOOD, supra note 272, at 80-81. 
280 Plan of Separation ( June 8, 1844), in HENRY WALLER, FRANCIS T. HORD & RICH-
ARD H. STANTON, THE METHODIST CHURCH CASE, AT MAYSVILLE KENTUCKY 13, 13 
(Maysville, Eagle Office 1848). 
281 MATHEWS, supra note 270, at 268. 
282 See JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH, HELD IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, 1844, at 85-88 (N.Y., Carlton & Phillips 1856) 
[hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE].  
283 See, e.g., Gibson v. Armstrong, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 481 (1847) (awarding the entire property 
of a local Methodist church in Maysville to the southern branch, based on majority rule).  
284 JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE, supra note 282, at 137.  
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consider their options locally, and then to send delegates to a convention in 
Louisville, Kentucky, to begin on May 1, 1845, exactly one year after the 
General Conference.285 Initial support for separation in local conferences 
was particularly strong in low-lying areas where slavery was most profitable, 
but by the time of the 1845 Louisville convention, the vote of all southern 
conferences was ninety-five to two in favor of separation.286 The Methodist 
Episcopal Church, South (MECS) was born. Southern reliance on the Plan 
as the charter for achieving such a division was unanimous. “The Methodist 
Episcopal Church,” pronounced one scholar, “was no longer a national 
institution.”287 Many studies of the schism end here.288 
B. The Question of Localism 
Or maybe not so fast. The Plan that had been crafted in 1844 was de-
signed to calm the waters, but Southerners’ adoption of the template 
occurred just as northern delegates learned that many of their constituents 
were outraged at the thought that the church could be split. Methodists 
married a centralized formal structure of governance with deep localism and 
local power: “[T]he bone and sinew of American Methodism was its local 
cast, its face-to-face exhortations, its communitarian quality,” wrote one 
scholar of antebellum Methodism and its many divisions over slavery.289  
The tension between the localized and centralized aspects of the denom-
ination exploded into full view after 1844. Local Methodist groups in the 
North argued trenchantly that their own church constitution was one of 
limited powers and that the General Conference had no capacity to divide 
what had been created as an indivisible community of faith. To them, the 
process of salvation was conducted locally, one soul at a time, based on 
individual conscience and local communities of belief. Across the North, the 
argument that the General Conference had acted contrary to the denomina-
tion’s founding constitution gained adherents in late 1844 and early 1845.290 
In Illinois and elsewhere, local conferences decided first that they had final 
authority and then voted to declare the Plan invalid.291 Even former sup-
porters began to waver, in light of the “bad temper and unchristian spirit of 
 
285 NORWOOD, supra note 272, at 96-97. 
286 Id. at 100. Some accounts of the dissolution of the South’s connection with the North 
record the vote as ninety-four to three. See, e.g., MATHEWS, supra note 270, at 279. 
287 MATHEWS, supra note 270, at 279. 
288 See, e.g., id. 
289 Padgett, supra note 271, at 72. 
290 See Resolutions of the Illinois Conference, CHRISTIAN ADVOC. & J., Oct. 15, 1845, at 39 
(resolving that the creation of the MECS was a “direct contravention of . . . the Discipline”).  
291 Id. 
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the South” during and after the Louisville convention.292 Momentum built 
in opposition to the Plan first in Ohio, then in Illinois, Baltimore, Philadel-
phia, and New Jersey, where delegates overwhelmingly voted no.293  
Especially important, given the rapidity of the response in the South, 
the issue of property rights in the Book Concerns provided a crucial 
battleground for Northerners who sought to defend the purity of the church 
against southern aggression. By the late 1840s, the combined Methodist 
Book Concerns was the largest publishing organization in the world. The 
Plan had urged local northern conferences to amend the denominational 
constitution to allow division of the property. In the northern conferences, a 
bare majority had endorsed the Plan—mostly in votes taken before the 
months of debate that fleshed out constitutional objections. Adding in the 
overwhelming approval of southern conferences only raised the vote to two-
to-one in favor. But the church constitution required a three-fourths 
majority for any constitutional change, so the proposed amendment techni-
cally had been defeated by mid-1845. In 1848, the next quadrennial General 
Conference—minus the “southern section,” which by then considered itself 
a separate Methodism—repudiated the action of 1844 by a large majority 
and declared all separatist actions taken according to the Plan to be null and 
void.294 
The notion that separation would reduce tension was utterly discredited 
by this controversy. Southerners called their northern brethren hypocrites 
and liars.295 Most scholarship on the schism is of considerable vintage. As 
late as 1923, the most thorough study of the events of the late 1840s sympa-
thized with the South: “[S]peaking in all charity, we cannot help feeling 
that it was a mistake to repudiate the Plan of Separation.”296 Revisiting the 
battles in the twenty-first century, it is clear that the relationship between 
slavery and salvation could not be resolved by a simple “plan.” Equally 
important, the issue of local power and individual religious experience was 
wrapped up in these debates, making race a key component of politics as 
 
292 NORWOOD, supra note 272, at 109.  
293 Id. at 117 n.53 (providing the breakdown of votes for and against the Plan at conferences 
in Ohio, Illinois, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New Jersey). 
294 See generally Richard J. Carwardine, Methodists, Politics, and the Coming of the American 
Civil War, in METHODISM AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 309, 331-34 (Nathan 
O. Hatch & John H. Wigger eds., 2001); Arthur E. Jones, Jr., The Years of Disagreement, 1844–61, 
in 2 THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN METHODISM, supra note 176, at 144, 168-76. 
295  See RAY HOLDER, WILLIAM WINANS: METHODIST LEADER IN ANTEBELLUM 
MISSISSIPPI 193 (1977) (“[Northerners had] shown an utter contempt for public opinion, which 
must and will take account of this reckless disregard of consistency, solemn engagements and 
common justice.” (quoting William Winans)). 
296 NORWOOD, supra note 272, at 125. 
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well as faith. Northern Methodists were convinced that concession on such 
matters was fundamentally contrary to Methodism itself.  
Although some desultory correspondence occurred between the North 
and South after the 1848 General Conference, it produced nothing to 
appease the South: in June 1849, the MECS commissioners filed suits in 
federal courts in Cincinnati and New York.297 Suddenly but predictably, 
arguments over the schism were channeled into the courts. Given the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 1841 decision in Presbyterian Congregation v. 
Johnston that the majority rules,298 Northerners might well have hoped that 
their greater numbers would be a bulwark against MECS’s claims to the 
Book Concerns. The litigation pitted the largest denomination in the 
country against its dissenting former members—a painful and public airing 
of the long-simmering conflict over the relationship between local control 
and human rights, on the one hand, and the untouchable issue of slavery, on 
the other. 
The New York case, where the most money was at stake, featured a 
lineup of leading members of the New York and Boston bars and was tried 
before U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Nelson, riding circuit, and 
District Court Judge Samuel Betts.299 Representing MECS, Daniel Lord 
(founder of the law firm Lord, Day & Lord) argued that anything not 
explicitly forbidden by the church constitution should be left to the discre-
tion of the General Conference.300 In other words, the South argued for a 
presumption of power in the central government of the church and that 
local jurisdictions should be powerless to override this government, includ-
ing even the decision whether to separate or not—a striking departure from 
traditional associations with southern localism.301 Learned counsel for the 
opposition, the well-known litigator Rufus Choate of Boston, argued that 
even if the Conference had the power to enact the Plan of Separation, it was 
now void because the stipulated conditions had not been met. 302  The 
implication was that the MECS had lost all rights to the Book Concern 
property by severing itself from the only valid American Methodist church.  
 
297 Smith v. Swormstedt, 22 F. Cas. 663 (C.C.D. Ohio 1852) (No. 13,112), rev’d, 57 U.S. (16 
How.) 288 (1854); Bascom v. Lane, 2 F. Cas. 994 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 1089).  
298 1 Watts & Serg. 9, 38-39 (Pa. 1841). 
299 Bascom, 2 F. Cas. 994. For a full transcript of all nine days of trial, including the lawyers’ 
arguments, see ROBERT SUTTON, THE METHODIST CHURCH PROPERTY CASE (Richmond 
& Louisville, John Early 1851). 
300 Lord’s arguments are reprinted in SUTTON, supra note 299, at 149-209. 
301 Id. 
302 Choate’s arguments are reprinted in id. at 231-91. 
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C. Mere Money 
The New York case excited widespread press attention and oft-repeated 
“regrets” that men of God should be battling so vigorously over funds (a 
central feature, of course, of the many cases that featured battles over 
worldly goods). And apparently there were substantial sums at stake. 
Although no formal valuation appears in the record, the capital of Book 
Concern in New York was placed at “nearly a million of dollars” by Justice 
Nelson, writing for the Court in the Swormstedt appeal.303 The MECS 
newspaper, Christian Advocate and Journal, squirmed at the publicity: “The 
idea of a litigation between two religious bodies, in relation to money, has a 
rather bad appearance, and always gives occasion for scandal.”304 Even the 
judges and lawyers advised the litigants to settle the case rather than expose 
themselves further. As Justice Nelson put it at the close of the trial but 
before issuing his opinion, “[T]he good feeling and Christian fellowship of 
the different sections of the Church will be much better [served] by an 
amicable and friendly adjustment of this controversy than by any legal 
disposition of it by the Court.”305 But when they met to discuss the case, the 
two sides were so far apart that negotiations proved fruitless.306 
Justice Nelson’s opinion was a resounding victory for the South. He had 
long been known as a supporter of the South and slavery, and his opinion 
confirmed this predisposition.307 The “action of the several annual confer-
ences in the slave-holding states,” Nelson held, was the only requirement 
under the Plan of Separation to establish “an absolute division of the church 
organization” into “two separate bodies.”308 The General Conference, in this 
view, was the plenary authority. The annual, local meetings were essentially 
dependent upon the general convention, which “from time to time” con-
ferred authority and power on the local bodies, such as the power conferred 
on the southern section to determine whether division was required because 
of the “deep and irreconcilable” opinions of the two sections regarding the 
ownership of slaves by the ministry.309 The moment the decision to separate 
was taken at Louisville, Nelson held, division of the property became 
operative: “[T]he division of the property was but a consequence of separa-
 
303 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 304 (1854), rev’g 22 F. Cas. 663 (C.C.D. 
Ohio 1852) (No. 13,112). 
304 Upshot of the Arbitration Measure, CHRISTIAN ADVOC. & J., July 17, 1851, at 26. 
305 SUTTON, supra note 299, at 368. 
306 Jones, supra note 294, at 178. 
307 On attacks from northern abolitionists directed against Nelson and other proslavery Jus-
tices in the early 1850s, see 2 WARREN, supra note 252, at 503, 543, 547.  
308 Bascom v. Lane, 2 F. Cas. 994, 999 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 1089). 
309 Id. at 1000-01. 
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tion, subordinate, and of comparative insignificance. Instead of the division 
of the church depending upon the division of the common property, the 
very reverse is the result of the true construction of the plan of separa-
tion.”310 And then, because the northern church could not apportion the 
property without amending the church constitution, “[t]he law steps in and 
enforces the right.”311  
In this way, the court forcibly amended the constitution of the Method-
ist Church, an extraordinary step, even for antebellum judges. Justice 
Nelson was firm in his assertion that principles of law and equity required 
judicial interference to ensure that the fund was properly divided. The issue 
was far from over, however. Nelson’s opinion was attacked in the northern 
press, in part on the ground that his reasoning and language so closely 
mirrored Lord’s pro-southern argument.312 
The following year in Cincinnati, Circuit Judge Humphrey Leavitt 
reached the opposite conclusion in a long and painstaking opinion, evidently 
written despite some trepidation that he was flouting the opinion of a 
sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justice.313 The Cincinnati branch of the Book 
Concern was founded in 1820 and incorporated by an act of the Ohio 
legislature in 1839 expressly to “conduct the business of the Concern in 
conformity with the rules and regulations of the said general conference.”314 
Like the New York Concern, it had grown in value, and its profits were 
dedicated entirely to the relief of traveling preachers who were “superannu-
ated, and the widows and orphans of those who were deceased.”315 The 
“unfortunate controversy” between the two Methodisms in this case was 
identical to the New York battle.316 
Judge Leavitt’s interpretation of the powers delegated to the General 
Conference in the church constitution directly contradicted Nelson’s: 
Leavitt stressed that the Conference’s authority was enumerated rather than 
plenary. He held, “The power of change—of destruction itself—doubtless 
exists somewhere; but, if it has not been expressly delegated, it remains 
with those who are the original depositaries of all power”—that is, with the 
membership.317 Such a construction, Leavitt maintained, was mandated by 
 
310 Id. at 1000. 
311 Id. at 1003. 
312 Jones, supra note 294, at 179. 
313 Smith v. Swormstedt, 22 F. Cas. 663 (C.C.D. Ohio 1852) (No. 13,112), rev’d, 57 U.S. (16 
How.) 288 (1854). 
314 Id. at 664 (quoting the act of incorporation). 
315 Id. at 665. 
316 Id. at 664-65. 
317 Id. at 667. 
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the restrictions on the General Conference (such as the requirement that 
any alteration of the beneficiaries of the Book Concern must be approved by 
a two-thirds vote of a General Conference and then a three-fourths vote of 
the local annual conferences). This conclusion was also supported by 
democratic principles and “our republican institutions,” which Leavitt found 
to be consistent with a local form of governance rather than a centralized, 
plenary authority.318  
Even southern partisans had conceded this point in their objections to 
the treatment of Bishop Andrew in 1844 at the General Conference, Leavitt 
pointed out. At that time, outraged Southerners argued that the General 
Conference had no power to “represent” the church as a whole, because it 
only had “limited powers to do its business in the discharge of a delegated 
trust.”319 And while the southern section certainly had the power to “with-
draw” from the church, it could not negotiate terms for division, which the 
General Conference had no power to promise on its own, and which the 
annual conferences had repudiated. 320  Instead, what happened at the 
General Conference reflected only the “collisions of a warm discussion of 
[slavery] in the conference, [which threw off ] some sparks of unholy fire,”321 
not a legally cognizable contract to divide the property. 
The federal courts, then, disagreed over the question, just as the nation 
had done. Southerners argued for strong centralized church governance and 
were sustained by a New York judge who was a northern man with southern 
principles. In Ohio, Judge Leavitt, a Whig (who was no radical—he later 
refused to join the Republican Party)322 decided in favor of individualism 
and localism. The New York case was never appealed, in part because 
negotiations between the parties were revived after the decision was handed 
down. But the Ohio case went up to the U.S. Supreme Court, where none 
other than Justice Nelson reversed the decision below.323 Given that he 
wrote the opinion below in the companion case, his participation in the 
appeal would today be considered an obvious violation of judicial ethics. 
Writing such an opinion would have been untoward even in the mid-
nineteenth century, when sitting senators routinely argued Supreme Court 
cases and trial judges commonly sat on appeals in their own or companion 
cases in territorial supreme courts. 
 
318 Id. at 670. 
319 Id. at 671 (quoting trial document). 
320 Id. at 672-74. 
321 Id. at 673. 
322  Richard L. Aynes, Humphrey Howe Leavitt, AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE, 
http://www.anb.org/articles/11/11-00512.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). 
323 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1854). 
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Perhaps because of such lapses in judgment, Samuel Nelson never be-
came a revered jurisprude.324 He is obscure today, known primarily as the 
author of the original majority opinion in the Dred Scott case. Nelson’s 
draft became a separate concurrence after Chief Justice Taney decided that 
he would write a far more broad-ranging and powerfully worded opinion, 
which catered to southern sentiment.325 
In Smith v. Swormstedt,326 Nelson copied whole sections of his opinion 
from the earlier New York circuit court opinion.327 He also avoided the 
substance of the dispute at the 1844 General Conference that triggered the 
Plan of Separation and all subsequent litigation, concluding implausibly that 
the “causes” of the schism were “not important particularly to refer to.”328 
The opinion did not mention slavery or slaveholding by members of the 
Methodist clergy.329 Instead, Nelson focused on the powers of the General 
Conference, which he held to be the “highest authority” in Methodism, and 
which had divided itself voluntarily into two new and distinct bodies, 
neither of which was the same as the national church before 1844.330 The pro 
rata division of the property followed “as a matter of law,” Nelson intoned 
once again, despite the objection that the church constitution explicitly 
required local conferences to approve changes in distribution.331 After this 
crushing defeat at the hands of Justice Nelson, delegates from the southern 
and northern Methodisms finally agreed on the payment of $251,000 from 
North to South.332  
Scholars have long argued that the schisms in the churches foreshad-
owed the political schism that rent the country after 1860. Some have even 
implied that the secessions of southern churches were critical to the erosion 
 
324 He was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court in the closing days of the Tyler admin-
istration, in February 1845; several prior nominees had been rejected by the Senate. Nelson’s 
confirmation was a surprise to Court watchers: though regarded as uncontroversial and careful, he 
was still a Democrat. Samuel Nelson, 13 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 422-23 
(Dumas Malone ed., 1934). 
325 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 457-69 (1857) (Nelson, J., concurring), superseded 
by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIG-
NIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 391 (1978); 3 WARREN, supra note 252, at 15-16. 
326 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288. 
327 Compare Bascom v. Lane, 2 F. Cas. 994, 994 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 1089), with Sworm-
stedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 299-300. 
328 Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 304. 
329 Nelson did concede that separate “ecclesiastical organizations” were created by the “slave-
holding States,” id. at 304-05, but the entire argument of the northern church is omitted. Id. at 
298-309. 
330 Id. at 304-05. 
331 Id. at 308-09. 
332 The Methodist Church Property, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1853, at 4; see also The Methodist Book 
Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1854, at 4 (discussing the background of the dispute). 
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of national loyalty that led to the political secessions of 1861 and the onset of 
civil war.333 Certainly President Lincoln viewed the northern Methodists’ 
support as vital to the war effort. In 1864, he wrote to thank that church in 
particular, for it sent “more soldiers to the field, more nurses to the hospi-
tals, and more prayers to Heaven than any.”334  
Yet all overlooked the relationship between disestablishment, legal re-
strictions on religious organizations, and schism in pre–Civil War America. 
Justice Joseph Story wrote in the 1830s that disestablishment had the goal of 
eliminating “all rivalry among Christian sects.”335 In reality, the discipline 
imposed on churches after disestablishment undergirded the development 
of a fiercely competitive religious culture based on the commitment to 
uncoerced liberty of belief. The protection of individual conscience, however, 
did not end conflict and division over religious questions. Despite the 
claims of Americans that they had “solved” the great problem of church and 
state,336 the truth on the ground was far less rosy.  
Disestablishment raised the issue of the moral ability of all individuals, 
enslaved or free, but the same focus on individual conscience made religious 
organizations more vulnerable to fracture. Paradoxically, this weakness was 
integrally related to the strength and vibrancy of religious life in antebellum 
America. It also coexisted with significant state oversight of religious 
organizations and limitations on their power to hold and control wealth. 
Viewed from up close, the first system of disestablishment was turbulent, 
messy, and often intrusive. 
CONCLUSION 
The most poignant lesson of this story is that individual empowerment 
in religious life was a key component of disestablishment—an essential 
complement to the limits on wealth and power imposed on religious 
 
333 See GOEN, supra note 174, 65-107; MATHEWS, supra note 270, at 290 (“In the dissolution 
of a national identity within the churches, the moral disjunction of the United States was 
institutionalized.”). 
334 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to the Methodist Episcopal Church (May 18, 1864), in 2 
STOKES, supra note 177, at illus. following p. 410. 
335  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 728 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). On Story’s concept of the proper relationship 
between Christianity and the U.S. governments (state and federal), see MCCLELLAN, supra note 
258, at 118-59. 
336 See, e.g., PHILIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (N.Y., 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1888). 
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institutions.337 This new American landscape consisted primarily of three 
components: government protection through the corporate form, limita-
tions on wealth, and imposition of lay control.  
Many Americans, especially those of the Tea Party persuasion, venerate 
“Christian” liberty (together with small government) as a central pillar of an 
inspired national Constitution. 338  In this story, they overlook the key 
features of legislation and the judicial management of disestablishment. In 
reality, this world was built just as much from political, legal, and religious 
furnishings of state legislation in the early nineteenth century as from the 
convictions of individual believers. Regulation, in the form of property 
limitations and lay control, both imposed by states, was widely understood 
as the surest means of protecting individual liberty to believe. 
 To the extent that history should govern our understanding of contem-
porary debates, this Article establishes that protection of the individual 
against the power of religious organizations was the central preoccupation 
of those charged with implementing the new law of religious liberty. Refusal 
to provide birth control to employees, campaigns against marriage equality, 
protection of religious organizations whose officials have sexually abused 
vulnerable parishioners, and even tax exemptions for religious property (not 
to mention tax-exempt bond funding) all look different when viewed 
through this lens. Seeing like a state in the first era of disestablishment 
means attending to the sovereign people, allowing them to choose, and 
allowing them to change their minds. This regime was a difficult one with 
respect to the stability of religious organizations, but a productive one 
nonetheless. 
Equally important, church property cases are widespread again in a new 
age of schism. A growing number of states have embraced the Supreme 
Court’s most recent case on the question, Jones v. Wolf.339 In that case—
which arose when conservatives sought to leave a Presbyterian church in 
Georgia after the national denomination approved the ordination of women—
the Court held that states may validly use “neutral principles of law” to 
 
337 Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has argued that “the Establishment Clause is 
best understood as a federalism provision—it protects state establishments from federal interfer-
ence but does not protect any individual right.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 
1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (same). To the extent that state experience is relevant, however, 
disestablishment was a vitally important protection of individual rights in early America. 
338 See generally JILL LEPORE, THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY’S REV-
OLUTION AND THE BATTLE OVER AMERICAN HISTORY 98-125 (2010). 
339 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
  
372 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 307 
 
decide such disputes.340 Courts may impose secular standards where cases 
arise out of disputes that begin in doctrine and practice of the faith but 
involve temporal assets.341 This standard, which was first adopted by the 
Court in the late 1970s, has proven difficult to apply, but more reliable than 
a standard of deference to religious hierarchy.342 Those who defend “church 
autonomy” or “the freedom of the church” oppose the Wolf standard vigor-
ously, often on historical grounds that appear unsustainable in light of the 
research presented here.343 
When church autonomy and separation are out of the picture, the land-
scape shifts: just as it was at the inception, state protection of the rights of 
individual believers, rather than institutions, becomes the central focus of 
disestablishment. Government involvement in disputes over the rights of 
religious institutions traditionally protected individual conscience rather 
than institutional autonomy. In this light, disestablishment has a powerful 
moral core, one which has had great influence in religious life and law, but 
which has been too often overlooked. 
 
340 Id. at 602-06. Justice Powell dissented, arguing that such an approach would increase 
court involvement in church controversies. Id. at 610 (Powell, J., dissenting). However, courts were 
already involved to a far greater extent than previously known—a circumstance that was widely 
tolerated. 
341 Id. at 602-06. 
342 Such a standard of deference was first imposed by the Supreme Court after the Civil War 
in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), a case arising out of the schisms over slavery. The 
standard was not reliably applied in state courts for many decades; even Justice Strong, who had 
sat on the Watson Court, did not think to mention the case in his lectures on law and religion in 
1875. STRONG, supra note 22.  
343 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
